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bitchgirl

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Describe the successes and failures of the Wehrmacht
(German fighting forces) 1935-1945

the Wehrmacht or as known as the German fighting forces was an army made up of Germans that fight battles during world war 2, The success of the Wehrmacht is that it was a powerful German force during WW2. The Reichswehr had many successes but ultimately failures at crucial battles led to their capitulation in WWII. The new, post-war military was established under these terms on 23 March 1921 under the name Reichswehr. General conscription was abolished, as mandated by the Versailles treaty will suffice.

During a war between the Allies (Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands) World War II a great number of foreign volunteers served in the ranks of the Wehrmacht. Among them were ethnic Germans, Dutch, Scandinavians, people from the Baltic states, and from the Balkans. Russians fought in the Russian Liberation Army, and non-Russians from the Soviet Union formed the Ostlegionen. All of these units were managed by a specially appointed general within the high command, Ernst August Kostring. Altogether they made up about 5 percent of the Wehrmacht men. Wehrmacht was the name of the armed forces of Germany from 1935 to 1945. It replaced the old Reichswehr and was succeeded by the current Bundeswehr.
The German word Wehrmacht literally defence force predates the 1930s and originally meant the entirety of the armed forces of a given country or another entity, e.g. Christianity. Since World War II, the term is almost as closely associated with the so-called Third Reich in German as it is in English. After World War I had ended with the capitulation of the German empire, the treaty of Versailles imposed severe restrictions on the future military strength of Germany. The size of the army was limited to 100,000 men, with an additional 15,000 men in the navy. The air force was dissolved. The fleet was to consist of at most six battleships, six cruisers, and twelve destroyers; tanks and heavy artillery were forbidden. The new, post-war military was established under these terms on 23 March 1921 under the name Reichswehr. General conscription was abolished, as mandated by the Versailles treaty.

After World War I ended with a capitulation of the German empire the treaty of Versailles imposed severe restrictions on Germany's military strength. The army was limited to 100 000 men with an additional 15 000 in the navy. The fleet was to consist of at most six battleships, six cruisers, and twelve destroyers. Tanks and heavy artillery were forbidden and the air force was dissolved. A new post war military the Reichswehr was established on 23 March 1921. General conscription was abolished under another mandate of the Versailles treaty. Germany immediately began circumventing these conditions. A secret collaboration with the Soviet Union began after the treaty of Rapallo. Major General Otto Hasse travelled to Moscow in 1923 to further negotiate the terms. Germany helped Soviet Russia with industrialisation and Russian officers were to be trained in Germany. German tank and air force specialists would be trained in Russia and German chemical weapons research and manufacture would be carried out there along with other projects. Around 300 German pilots received training at Lipetsk, some tank training took place near Kazan and toxic gas was developed at Saratov. The number of soldiers who served in the Wehrmacht during its existence from 1934 until 1945 is believed to approach 18.2 million, but these were not simultaneous enlistments. About 5.3 million died on battlefields and approximately 11 million were captured by enemy forces it is not known how many died in captivity.

The Battle of Stalingrad was a major turning point in World War II, and is considered the bloodiest and largest battle in human history and arguably one of the greatest comebacks in military history. The battle was marked by the brutality and disregard for civilian casualties on both sides. It is taken to include the German bombing campaign of the southern Russian city of Stalingrad, the German march towards the city, the battle inside the city itself, and the Soviet counter-offensive which eventually trapped and destroyed the German and other Axis forces in and around the city. Total casualties are estimated at anywhere between 1.5 to 3 million. The lack of exact data is the result of the Russian government's refusal at the time to calculate the losses for fear the sacrifice might have proven too high. The Axis powers lost about a quarter of their total manpower on the Eastern Front, and never recovered from the defeat. For the Soviets, who lost well over one million soldiers and civilians during the battle, the victory at Stalingrad marked the start of the liberation of the Soviet Union, leading to eventual victory over Nazi Germany in 1945. After the narrow failure of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941 the German Army no longer had the strength and resources for a renewed offensive of that year's scale, but Hitler was unwilling to stay on the defensive and consolidate his gains. So he searched for an offensive solution that with limited means might promise more than a limited result. No longer having the strength to attack along the whole front, he concentrated on. the southern part, with the aim of capturing the Caucasus oil which each side needed if it was to maintain its full mobility. If he could gain that oil, he might subsequently turn north onto the rear of the thus immobilized Russian armies covering Moscow, or even strike at Russia's new war-industries that had been established in the Urals. The 1942 offensive was, however, a greater gamble than that of the previous year because, if it were to be checked, the long flank of this southerly drive would be exposed to a counterstroke anywhere along its thousand-mile stretch.

The military strength of the Wehrmacht rested on assignment-based tactics as opposed to order-based tactics and the almost proverbial discipline. Today, the Wehrmacht is often seen as a high-tech army, due to many new technologies that were introduced during World War II, like the so-called reprisal weapons, the 262 jet fighter, or the submarine force, but this is a somewhat misleading impression. Overall, the level of armament was low. For instance, only 40 percent of all units were motorised. The baggage train often had to rely on horses as a means of transportation, and many soldiers went by foot or, in some instances, used bicycles.
A powerful tank force and a powerful air force made possible the quick successes in the early stages of war, when nation after nation was overrun and occupied within mere weeks. This quelled critical voices and convinced military leaders that the new concept of broad armament rather than deep armament did indeed make sense; however in the later stages of war, when the powerful adversaries An island comprising England and Scotland and Wales Great Britain, the A former communist country in eastern Europe and northern Asia, established in 1922, included Russia and 14 other soviet socialist republics Ukraine and Byelorussia an others officially dissolved 31 December 1991 Soviet Union, and the North American republic containing 50 states 48 conterminous states in North America plus Alaska in northwest North America and the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific Ocean; achieved independence in 1776 United States offered tenacious resistance, the Blitzkrieg tactics could not be applied, and the relatively low state of armament turned out detrimental for the Wehrmacht.

The military was one of the few organisations that could evade political meddling to a significant extent during the Third Reich. As most of the leadership was politically conservative, and Hitler promised to rebuild Germany's military strength, it was mostly sympathetic towards the National Socialist revolution. However, when, in the later stages of war, political influence in the military command began to increase, and under Hitler's flawed strategic decisions the good fortune of the German armies waned, tensions mounted between the military and the government. These culminated in the so-called July 20 plot in 1944, when a group of Wehrmacht officers led by Claus von Stauffenberg tried to assassinate Hitler and overthrow his government. Following the attempt, Hitler distrusted the Wehrmacht and the conservative forces of Germany, and thousands were persecuted and killed, including many Wehrmacht officers. Germany immediately began to pursue plans to circumvent the conditions of the treaty. Key to the quest for the rebuilding of a strong military was the secret collaboration with the Soviet Union that began after the treaty of Rapallo. In 1923, Major General Otto Hasse travelled to Moscow to negotiate the terms of collaboration. Germany helped Soviet Russia with the industrialisation of the country, and Russian officers would be trained in Germany; in return, German tank and air force specialists would be trained in Russia, German chemical weapons research and manufacture would be carried out there, among others. 300 German pilots received training at Lipetsk, tank training took place near Kazan although only to a small extent, and toxic gas was developed at Saratov.

Beginning immediately after the death of president Paul von Hindenburg on 2 August 1934, all soldiers had to take an oath on Adolf Hitler personally, this oath was given as a reason by many soldiers for their continued loyalty for the government, even after they had mentally seceded from National Socialist ideology. In the following years, Germany ignored the Versailles provisions in an increasingly open way. General conscription was reintroduced on 16 March 1935. The size of the standing army remained at about 100 000, but each year another 100 000 received training. The same law introduced the name Wehrmacht, so that this day can be regarded as the date when the Wehrmacht was officially founded. As insignia, it chose a stylised version of the Iron Cross that had first appeared as an aircraft and tank marking in late World War I.




The number of soldiers who served in the Wehrmacht during the time of its existence is believed to be as high as 18.2 million, but these men did not all serve simultaneously. About 5.3 million men died on the field of battle, and about 11 million were captured by enemy forces. It is not known how many of them died in captivity. During World War II, a great number of foreign volunteers served in the ranks of the Wehrmacht. Among them were ethnic Germans, Dutch, Scandinavians, people from the Baltic states, and from the Balkans. Russians fought in the Russian Liberation Army, and non-Russians from the Soviet Union formed the Ostlegionen. All of these units were managed by a specially appointed general within the high command. Altogether they made up about 5 percent of the Wehrmacht men.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht was the German Chancellor, a position Adolf Hitler held since 1933. The administration and military authority initially lay with the war ministry under Werner von Bloomberg. In 1938, after von Bloomberg resigned in the course of the Bloomberg-Fritsch Affair, the ministry was dissolved, and the Armed Forces High Command, in German Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), under Wilhelm Keitel was put in its place. The OKW coordinated all military activities, but Keitel's sway over the three branches of service, army, air force, and navy, was rather limited. Each had its own High Command, known as Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH, army), Oberkommando der Marine (OKM, navy), and Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL, air force). Within these high commands, each branch had its own general staff. Actions committed by the Nazi regime often viewed as war crimes were committed for the most part not by the military, but rather by the Nazi party's paramilitary SS organisation. However, the Wehrmacht did participate in many of these actions by providing logistical support, securing the area, and handing over prisoners to the SS. When fighting guerrillas, the war was often brutal on both sides and brutal revenge was often exerted on the civilian population. The bombing of cities like Rotterdam or Coventry, but also (prominently) of Georgica although these forces were under Spanish command of Franco, is also often criticized.

Lithuanian Volunteers in the German Wehrmacht in WWII, when Germany crossed the Eastern frontier during the Invasion of the Soviet Union on June 21st, 1941, the people of the Baltic regions were quick to take up arms against the fleeing Communist forces. The Soviets had exacted a bloody toll from the Baltic’s, and the Lithuanians suffered as much as their northern neighbours, Latvia and Estonia. In the face of such brutal treatment, and with the German invasion providing an impetus for revolt, the Baltic’s erupted as thousands of freedom-fighters rose up to fight off and liberate entire portions of their nations. It is estimated that at least 125,000 Lithuanians rose up to fight the retreating Soviets during the time between the initial German crossing of the eastern frontier and the final evacuation of all Russian troops. At least 4,000 are said to have been killed during this period, and another 10,000 wounded in action. Numerous Lithuanian cities were also liberated even before the Germans arrived, a sign of the fierceness with which the Lithuanians were willing to fight for their homeland. Unlike her Estonian and Latvian neighbours though, Lithuania never provided Germany with a National Legion during WWII, although from the very start of the German occupation quite a few volunteers came forward. It is estimated that as many as 50,000 eventually served in German sponsored units during 1941-45. In fact, many volunteers were initially deserters from the Soviet 29th light Infantry Corps - a unit which the Soviets formed emeses from the entire Lithuanian ground forces after their occupation of the country in 1939. The other major source of volunteers and conscripts during the initial stage of German occupation were the numerous ad-hoc units formed as the Soviets were fleeing. For the most part, as in the other Baltic nations, these Lithuanian ad-hoc units were disbanded once the German occupation was complete. In some case though select units provided the basis for new self defence formations formed by the Germans for security operations. It is from these origins that the organizational history of Lithuanian units under Axis occupation begins.










As mentioned above, Lithuanians were for the most part formed into auxiliary support units for security operations. The first formal unit to be formed was known as the Lituanische Hunterschaften which was later used as a foundation for a series of self defence units known as Selbschutz-Bataillonen. The Selbschutz-Bataillonen units were later brought under the control of the German organization of uniformed frontline police, the Ordungspolizie, and renamed as Schutzmannschaft-Bataillonen or Schumas. The Schuma units were universally renamed and reformed into Polizie-Bataillonen in May of 1943. Nearly all units were formed in battalion-sized units consisting of between 500 and 600 men each. They were primarily assigned to rear-area security duties, but as the Soviets drew nearer to Lithuania, they also saw service fighting the Soviets directly. These Lithuanian units numbered a total of 35 Battalions during WWII, consisting of units numbered 1-15, 251-257, 263-265, and 301-310. 13 of these units, numbers 263-265 and 301-310, were never fully trained and were disbanded before they could be employed in combat. These units were posted variously to Poland, Byelorussia, the other Baltic countries, and even as far away as the southern Ukraine. As the Soviets approached, the Germans took to grouping 3 or 4 Lithuanian Polizie-Bataillonen into regimental-sized units know as Lituanische Freiwilligen-Infanterie-Regimenter. Three such units were formed as the Soviets reached the border and they were sent directly to the front in the attempt at holding back the Soviet onslaught in late 1944 and early 1945.

Immediately after the seizure of power of the national socialists 1933 new realm chancellor Adolf Hitler did not recognize the regulations of the Versailles of contract of 1919, which fixed the army strength of the realm resistance on 100 000 career soldiers, for Germany as the no more binding on. The realm military guidance, fascinated of the chance for the reclaim of Germany to the military great power, unconditionally supported Hitler's foreign policy , which aimed completely openly at the revision of the treaty system of Versailles. In order to force armament begun already in the Weimar Republic secretly, Hitler on initiative of realm military Minister general Werner von Bloomberg decided 1933 to leaving that Geneva disarmament conference and to the withdrawal from the voelkerbund . Bloomberg forced and its boss Minister office, Walter von Reichenau , also the freiwillige subjecting the military under the claim to leadership of Hitler and the National Socialist German labour party, In 1934 it began political training courses with materials of the NSDAP in the army, into which National Socialist ideas were in-carried particularly by the younger officers and NCOS. When Hitler the ambitious ambitions of Ernst Rohm to equip the storm department with national weapon monopoly with which liquidating met the entire SA guidance and which realm resistance explained as the only weapon carrier of the realm, thanked it Bloomberg on 2 August 1934 with the oath achievement of the realm resistance on the person of the leader. The personal oath on Hitler instead of on the condition should until 1945 for a multiplicity of soldiers an almost insurmountable ethical barrier represent to follow despite regime-hostile attitude the resistance in the armed forces and take part at assassination attempt plans against Hitler. Since the German arms concept with the existing regular army pushed fast to personnel borders, the law intended the introduction of the compulsory military service for the structure of the armed forces from 16 March 1935 . Highest commander of the armed forces was Hitler. Under him the realm war Minister exercised the command authority as a commander in chief of the armed forces. With the change of name of realm resistance in armed forces 1935 also openly the defensive strategy of the army developed during the Weimar Republic changed. The contemporaneous renaming of realm military Minister in realm war Ministers and realm navy in war navy pointed already on structures of an attack army as well as on the beginning of width armament and war preparations, which Hitler finally outlined in writing one year later. In a secret memorandum to the four-year plan he explained in August 1936, the armed forces must in 4 years operationally.











Between 1933 and at the end of 1936 the army strength of the armed forces on 550 000 men. In 1939 it reached the army a strength of scarcely 2.75 million soldier. For the increase of the attack force of the army under its commander in chief Werner baron von Fritsch starting from 1935 above all the structure was forced by fast federations and the amor branch created by Heinz Guderian, which the modern requirements should withstand mobile and spacious warfare. The army was arranged starting from 1935 in three, after the connection of Austria 1938 into six group commands. With the launching of a vessel of the battle ship crowd refuge 1936 in Germany began the purposeful fleet armament of the war navy under admiral Erich wheels . One year later with "Bismarck" and the Tirpitz three further followed the first battle ship of the war navy with the Gneisenau 1938 as well as. 1939 had the 50 000 men strong war navy besides three tank ships, two weight as well as six light cruisers, 22 destroyers, 16 torpedo boats and 57 submarines. A rapid development took on 1 March 1935 officially the Air Force under the supreme command, integrated as the third branch of service beside army and navy into the armed forces , due to extensive secret preparations realm aviation Minister Hermann Goering . Above all their impact force tested the armed forces starting from 1936 with the German intervention in the Spanish civil war . 1939 covered the Air Force 400 000 men and over 4 000 combat aircraft of most modern design. The costs of armament and the economical consequences of the war-preparing military economy were immense. Doubts against Hitler's rapid armament politics and against risky the with regard to foreign policy war preparations expressed 1937 Bloomberg and Fritsch in November. Intolerable the generals become for him got rid of Hitler in the course of one of skill fully intrigued double affair at the beginning of 1938. Hitler dissolved at the same time the realm war Ministry and took over personally the supreme command over the armed forces. With the again created and him directly subordinated supreme command of the armed forces (OKW) under general William Keitel installed for Hitler a gefuegige military command and management level. The general staff of the army was reshuffled for the supreme command of the army (OKH) under Walther of Brauchitsch.

Despite these measures Hitler did not succeed the prevention of a limited resistance in the armed forces, which around general Ludwig Beck , Hans Ouster and admiral Wilhelm Canaries developed. Their efforts to attain due to threatening kriegsgefahr during the Sudetenkrise 1938 with higher officers support for a revolution attempt against Hitler failed because of the rejecting attitude of the generals. Although Hitler had given the overall directions for the campaigns of 1939-1941. he did not meddle in the day to day operations of the German army until after the defeat at Moscow. In response to the German retreat from Moscow, Hitler assumed direct control of the army in the field on the all important Eastern Front in December 1941. Hitler saw himself as a great military leader, and for the remainder of the war he directed operations in Russia personally, often against the advice of his senior military officers, and very often with disastrous results. Although well informed on some aspects of military operations, and in possession of a good general knowledge of weaponry, Hitler had no experience of war beyond hid service as a corporal in WWI. Residents of Munich the agreement and the German invasion into the Sudetengebiet in the autumn 1938 terminated for the time being all Putschplaene. Scarcely six years later - in the consciousness of the imminent German defeat in the Second World War as well as in view of million fold dying - the only serious coup d'etat attempt failed against Hitler with the missed assassination attempt because of 20 July 1944. Although it acted with the conspirators not as accepted by Hitler around a small group, but around a considerable number of officers, the by far largest part of the officer corps carried the Second World War, which had begun on 1 September 1939 with the German assault on Poland until May 1945.




The topic of WWII German auxiliary forces is a complex one. These organizations were by very nature not regular armed forces but auxiliaries to them. In fact, the only true auxiliary forces were the Wehrmacht, or armed forces auxiliaries, which were those formations or organizations that were not a part of the armed forces, but which served such an important support role that they were given protection under the Geneva Convention and/or militarised. Although some of the armed forces auxiliaries were militarised, it was specifically decreed that they not achieve armed forces status on par with the likes of the Heer, Luftwaffe or Kriegsmarine. Wehrmachtsgefolge provided all manner of support to the Wehrmacht in the form of added transportation, construction help, garrison and security work, combat engineering, railway repair, anti-aircraft defence, air raid protection and early warning services, and in the end, even frontline combat duty. The other forms of auxiliary formations, although not specifically known as Wehrmacht, such as the Hitler Jugend etc, also provided invaluable support to the Wehrmacht. Those listed here at left are by no means all such organizations that existed during WWII, but they are those that most directly supported the Wehrmacht or the war in general during and prior to WWII. Many of the auxiliary organizations were thrown into the last ditch attempt at preventing total defeat as WWII came to a close, many members being used in direct combat roles as the fronts collapsed. In the end all formations, armed forces auxiliaries or not, were disbanded and declared illegal with the fall of the Third Reich.
The War ended in 7th May 1945 where the German armed forces surrender to the allies and Hitler committed suicide.

There was numerous strategical blunders by Hitler and other commanders combined with the overall strength of the Allies sealed the fate of the Reichswehr in 1945, Despite these measures Hitler did not succeed the prevention of a limited resistance in the armed forces, Hitler failed because of the rejecting attitude of the generals and he didn’t’t listen to the generals and made up his own decisions of the army, most of Hitler's ideas to the war was the opposite of what his generals advice was given and often would be against it which cost the many lives of the German army and create a big loss to the Germans. Eventually the German Army lost in WWII and surrendered in 1945.
 

bitchgirl

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To what extent did Japanese militarism cause the outbreak of
war with the United States in 1941?

The extent to the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan was a turning point in the war, between America's militarism and Japan's militarism,
it shows the great powers coming in a confrontation of bombings and military strength between the 2 countries and causing major outbreak of the war between them,
the relationship between America and Japan hasnt at all improved which lead the outbreak of the war. Japan wanted a solution to weaken the American military which
Japan was moving rapidly down the road that led to Pearl Harbor and causing the outbreak of war between them.

The United States entered the War on December 7, 1941, the day that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. By the end of the War, more people were killed, more property destroyed, more people's lives were disrupted, and probably more far-reaching consequences were caused than any other war in history. World War II brought about the downfall of Western Europe as the center of world power, led to the rise of the Soviet Union, set up conditions leading to the Cold War, and opened the nuclear age. The Japanese knew that they could not continue to fight their war in china without the vital resources that were now being denied them by the Allied embargo implemented in June 1941. Therefore, they were faced with either losing face by withdrawing from China or finding resources they needed to continue the war, as Japan had no natural resources that could be used for industry. To strike sussessfully, the Japanese knew they would have to remove the only viable threat and that was the Americans at Pearl Harbor. So for the Americans to delay its entry into the Pacific war for 2 years. Emperor Hirohito was the Ulitimate symbol of Japanese militarism in the outbreak of war between Japan and The United States. In the period between the two world wars, Japan sought to establish control first of east Asia and then of the southwest Pacific. After a decade of liberal ascendancy and acquiescence in the post World War I agreements, the extremists in Japan gained power and embarked on a program of military preparation and territorial aggrandizement. First the Japanese moved into Manchuria and then into China, where they soon became involved in a war that dragged on interminably and from which they could extract neither victory nor honor. Having scrapped the Washington Treaty system, they withdrew from the League of Nations and from the naval disarmament system established in 1922 and 1930. Gradually they moved toward a closer understanding with Germany and Italy, and, in 1940, turned south to the rich British, French, and Dutch colonies of southeast Asia in search of raw materials they needed to carry on the war in China. Which cause tension with the United States and Japan and lead them into war with eachother. The United States opposed all these moves as vigorously as circumstances permitted. Since the turn of the century, when it had annexed the Philippines, the United States had been inextricably drawn into the confused politics and imperialist rivalries of the Far East. Despite the nation's traditional preference for remaining aloof from world affairs, it was abundantly clear that America could not remain indifferent to any change in the status quo in the Pacific or in Asia.In China remained the keystone of American policy in the years that followed. It was inevitable, therefore, that the United States would challenge the efforts of any power to gain a dominant position on the mainland of Asia. America's opposition to Japanese expansion in Asia, its insistence on the open-door policy and the integrity of China, led to mutual distrust and suspicion. No Japanese government could accept America's solution for the deepening crisis and remain in power; nor would the United States accede under any conditions to the dismemberment of China. There was no escape from this dilemma and by mid-1941, despite the utmost efforts of men of good will on both sides of the Pacific, Japan was moving rapidly down the road that led to Pearl Harbor.

It is clear that Japan did not interpret the Tripartite Pact as a commitment to war, and as a matter of fact, the Emperor agreed to it with misgivings and only after he had been assured that it would not lead to hostilities. The Konoye Cabinet evidently believed that the United States and the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Far East if the advance southward was achieved gradually and by diplomatic means. They hoped that the United States would be forced by the Tripartite Pact to remain neutral and that the issue would be between Japan and the British, Dutch, and French who were in no position to dispute Japanese expansion southward. Soviet opposition was to be overcome through the intervention of Germany. These hopes were entirely unrealistic. The United States had never retreated from its position on China and had declined time and again to recognize Japan's interpretation of treaties to which the United States was a party. Instead of showing any timidity or weakness, the United States Government on this occasion adopted a firm but cautious attitude. Cordell Hull announced to newsmen that the pact did not substantially alter the situation, but his statement was belied by the announcement on 8 October 1940 that consuls in the Far East had been instructed to advise American citizens to return home, and that three liners had been sent to the Orient to hasten their evacuation. Already the Pacific Fleet, which was normally based on the west coast, had been ordered to remain at Pearl Harbor indefinitely, and preparations were being made to strengthen American garrisons in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. While maintaining a firm attitude toward Japan, the United States Government adopted a policy designed to avoid an open struggle in the Pacific so that American resources would not be diverted from the main tasks strengthening the nation's military forces and aiding Britain. Japan, it was agreed, was not to be pushed to the point where her military elements would demand war The door was to be left open for discussion and agreement, but the United States was to maintain its treaty rights in the Far East, continue to exert economic pressure against Japan, and provide aid to China. The Tripartite Pact, in the view of the United States, had placed Japan in the Axis camp and Japan was to be treated as one of the Axis Powers. The last chance of settling Japanese-American conflicts as a separate problem, divorced from European affairs, was gone. In his Fireside Chat of 29 December 1940, President Roosevelt emphasized that the Tripartite Pact represented a threat to the United States and that the nation for its own defense must increase its aid to the free nations and make greater efforts to rearm. In spite of the fact that the Tripartite Pact had failed to convince the United States that acceptance of Japan's program for expansion was desirable, the Konoye Cabinet continued along the path laid out by the Liaison Conference of 27 July. Every effort was made to bring the war in China to an end, when air bombardment failed, the Japanese solicited the support of German diplomacy. The only result of these measures was another American loan to Chiang Kai-shek, this time for a hundred million dollars. Japanese policy was no more successful in the Indies. The conversations begun in September dragged on, with a new special envoy taking Kobayashi's place in January 1941. The Dutch so stoutly resisted Japanese pressure for economic co-operation that the new envoy reported that force alone would produce the desired results. But Japan was not yet ready for war and rather than lose prestige by breaking off the negotiations Konoye instructed the delegates to remain in Batavia. By this time Japan was feeling the pinch of shortages created by the controls the United States had instituted over shipments to Japan, and the relations between the two countries had improved not at all. Efforts to settle the outstanding disagreements between them had begun in February, when Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura arrived in the United States. After a series of preliminary talks with President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull, Nomura, on 18 April, handed the Americans a 7-point proposal as the basis for an agreement. Essentially, this proposal called for the United States to provide, or assist Japan in securing, strategic raw materials, and to persuade Chiang to reach agreement with Japan. In return, Japan would agree not to start war in the southwest Pacific and to interpret the Tripartite Pact as meaning Japan would support Germany only if that nation were the object of aggression. The proposal was not acceptable to the Americans and was made even less so by revisions from Tokyo. On 30 May, Mr. Hull presented an interim American proposal to Nomura and on 21 June a second draft, to which was attached a "verbal memo" containing a delicate reference to the lack of confidence the Americans had in the pro-Axis Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka. The negotiations had reached a deadlock and the only hopeful sign was the trouble brewing within the Japanese Cabinet where a change might produce a shift in the direction of Japanese policy. For almost six months the planners of the Joint Board considered the problem presented by simultaneous Axis aggression in the Atlantic and Pacific areas and finally in April 1939 submitted their report. In it they reviewed the world situation, estimated the likelihood of war, calculated the probable objectives of the Axis in Europe and Japan in the Far East, discussed the effects of concerted action by these powers on the United States, and analyzed the strategic problems involved in the various situations that might result from such action. So comprehensive was the report, such a model of strategic analysis, that it was characterized by the Joint Board as a monument to its planning committee and became the basis for much of the strategic planning before Pearl Harbor.








In their effort to arrive at a sound military strategy for the United States, the joint planners examined the various contingencies that might arise as a result of Axis aggression. Based on this examination, they concluded:

1. Germany and Italy would take overt action in the Western Hemisphere only if Great Britain and France remained neutral or were defeated.

2. Japan would continue to expand into China and Southeast Asia at the expense of Great Britain and the United States, by peaceful means if possible but by force if necessary.

3. The three Axis Powers would act together whenever the international situation seemed favorable. If other countries, including the United States, reacted promptly and vigorously to such action then a general war might well follow.

The reaction of the United States to these or any other situations that might arise, the planners pointed out, would depend in large measure on the forces available and the extent to which American interests were involved. In the event of a threat in both oceans simultaneously, the United States, they maintained, should assume the defensive in the Pacific, retaining adequate forces based on Hawaii to guard the strategic triangle. Arguing further in a manner reminiscent of planning, the strategists of the Joint Board declared that priority in a two-ocean war must go first to the defense of vital positions in the Western Hemisphere the Panama Canal and the Caribbean area. From bases in that region, the U.S. Fleet could operate in either ocean as the situation demanded, but its primary obligation must always be to control the Atlantic approaches to the Western Hemisphere, especially to the south where the continent was most exposed. This task would not be difficult if Great Britain and France actively opposed Axis aggression, but if they did not the security of the South Atlantic would become the major concern of U.S. forces.
In their studies the planners also considered the possibility of a war with Japan alone. The United States would have to expect to lose all its possessions west of 180 degrees early in such a war, which, the planners prophetically pointed out, might well begin with a Japanese effort "to damage major fleet units without warning," or a surprise attempt "to block the fleet in Pearl Harbor." It would be necessary, then, for American forces to fight their way back across the Pacific in a series of amphibious operations using one of four routes: (1) the Aleutians; (2) Pearl Harbor-Midway-Luzon; (3) the Marshalls-Carolines-Marianas-Yap-Peleliu; and (4) Samoa-New Guinea-Mindanao. The planners favored the second and third routes and thought that a combination of the two would have to be used. The garrisons in Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama were to be reinforced, but not the Philippines, apparently on the assumption that their loss was certain. The planners were astute enough to recognize, however, that emotionalized opinion rather than a reasoned adjustment of operations to the means at hand might ultimately dictate the choice of battleground.

American military forces in 1939 seemed sufficiently strong to accomplish the minimum tasks required under the strategic concept proposed by the planners -- defense of U.S. vital interests in the Western Hemisphere and in the Atlantic area. After hostilities began, American forces could be strengthened sufficiently to defeat the enemy operating in the Atlantic, even without the aid of Great Britain and France. If, at the same time, the United States maintained adequate defensive forces in the Pacific, Japan could probably be restricted to the western Pacific. It was even possible, in such a situation, that the Japanese leaders might prefer peace with the United States, hoping thereby to reap a profit from the war without cost to themselves. If, on the other hand, Japan initiated hostilities and the United States adopted a position of readiness but refrained from an advance to the western Pacific, the European Axis would probably not undertake any aggressive adventures in the Western Hemisphere. Thus, on all accounts, the planners held that a defensive strategy in the Pacific was preferable to any other course. The summer of 1941 was a crucial one for both Japan and the United States. Over a period of several years American planners had devised a strategy designed to protect the Western Hemisphere against Axis aggression and, if the United States was forced into war, to throw the bulk of its resources against Germany. But this strategy assumed, first, that Japan could be deterred from aggression by means short of war, and second, that in the event hostilities in the Far East could not be avoided, the United States would accept the loss of American territory in that area. The planners, unwilling to face the unpleasant prospect of large-scale military operations in the western Pacific, accepted these assumptions. But there were many, including the President and his Secretary of War, who found the conclusions of military logic distasteful and sought a way out of the dilemma. The solution provided by the advocates of air power turned American eyes once more to the Far East. The crisis facing the Japanese leaders was more serious. In their view the very existence of the nation depended on their decisions. There seemed to be no way to end the war in China and economic restrictions were crippling their efforts to stockpile strategic materials and prepare the nation for any eventuality. Japan was truly at the crossroad. By mid-August 1941, American military strategy for the Pacific and Far East which reflected the determination to avoid war with Japan and to remain on the defensive even if it meant the loss of the Philippines, Guam, and Wake -- no longer reflected the policy of the U.S. Government. There had been signs even before that was completed that American policy toward Japan was stiffening. The President's action in May making China eligible for lend-lease had marked the beginning of a shift in Far Eastern policy. Though it proved difficult to find any munitions to furnish China because early plans for lend-lease had been made entirely in terms of aid to Britain, by July the principle of arming a compact Chinese Army and Air Force with American weapons had been accepted with all the implications this had for relations with the Japanese. In addition, a mission under Brig. Gen. John Magruder was dispatched to China to aid in delivery of materials over the Burma Road and to assist the Chinese both in using the materials received and in placing orders properly. Magruder did not, however, have authority to discuss military plans with the Chinese, nor was he told what he should do if war broke out between the United States and Japan.

The order of freezing Japanese assets in the United States and establishing a oil embargo gave further confirmation of America's stiffening policy toward Japan. The planners had objected to the move on the ground that it might force Japan into war to gain the oil it so badly needed and thus imperil American interests in the Atlantic. The President believed too, as he had written Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes earlier in the month, that "it is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to help to keep peace in the Pacific," but felt, after the German attack on the Soviet Union had in effect lessened the immediate danger in the Atlantic and freed Japan to move south, that the United States could take a stronger stand in the Pacific. This conviction, shared by Stimson and others was a basic factor in the decisions made during the months before Pearl Harbor. By the end of August the Navy staff had worked out plans for seizing bases in the western Pacific, and had from Admiral Yamamoto a separate plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor. Table-top maneuvers at Tokyo Naval War College between 10-13 September resulted in agreement on operations for the seizure of the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, Burma, and islands in the South Pacific. But there was still some doubt about Yamamoto's plan. The exercise had demonstrated that a Pearl Harbor strike was practicable, but many felt that it was too risky, that the U.S. Pacific Fleet might not be in port on the day of the attack, and that the danger of discovery during the long voyage to Hawaii was too great. But Admiral Yamamoto refused to give up his plan and finally, when he failed to convert his colleagues, offered to resign from the Navy. The combination of his strong argument that the success of the southward drive depended on the destruction of the American fleet, his enormous prestige, and his threat to resign were too much for opponents of the plan. In mid-October, a month after the maneuvers, the Navy General Staff finally adopted his concept of a surprise carrier-based attack on Pearl Harbor and incorporated it into the larger plan for war.

By the fall of 1941 relations between the United States and Japan had reached a critical stage. American leaders had made it clear that so long as Japan adhered to the Tripartite Pact and to its efforts to conquer China there was little chance for compromise. But they needed time to complete their preparations.
For the Japanese, most of whom were unwilling to pay the American price for peace, time was of the essence. They were convinced that acceptance of American peace terms would only lead to further demands and ultimately leave Japan dependent on the United States and Great Britain. To them the gambles of war seemed preferable to the ignominy of a disgraceful peace. On 7th December 1941 the Japanese attacked the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the hope of knocking the United States out of a Pacific war. By doing so the Japanese hoped to be able to persue their strategic and imperialistic goals in the south. Japan's failure to achieve total victory meant that the japanese unified an isolationist nation against them, which then mobilised its mighty economy into a war machine that eventually defeated Japan. Initially, the Japanese achieved their aim of keeping the Americans out of war in the Pacific by leading a successful surprise attack, the Japanese attack without a daclaration of war had galvanised the American public behind the war effort, rather than having to deal with a fractured American war effort with the American people still fighting over their isolationist stance. The Japanese attack had triggered the strongest economy in the world to a level of war production that the Japanese could never hope to defeat in a long war.

The Japanese plan was to neutralise the United States, claim their terrotory and desired raw materials, then negotiate peace. The war between The United States and Japan has changed the war significantly and the cause of the war was because of Japan's Militarism and how it was affecting its relationships with America, militarism played a big part between them and caused the outbreak between them, Japan knew if they entered the war with America the Japanese couldnt uphold the American strength of its militarism.
 

hopeles5ly

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kc-ok-la said:
My notes on WW1,
based upon htye syllabus

War on the western front.
hope this is of use!
thanks for the notes, but it seems like u were quite pissed when you wrote them lol
 
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