Starcraftmazter
Member
I hope you aren't denying the fact that Georgian soldiers were in fact trained by Americans.withoutaface said:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_Train_and_Equip_Program
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Russia 'goes to war' with Georgia (2 Viewers)
- Thread starter bigboyjames
- Start date
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_Train_and_Equip_Program
Iron
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Salami tactics!
They know the flaw in the nuclear deterent! If you just slice off parts of nations, no one will risk nuclear war over it. Next thing we know, they're in London dancing their squatting polka with Her Majesty.
They know the flaw in the nuclear deterent! If you just slice off parts of nations, no one will risk nuclear war over it. Next thing we know, they're in London dancing their squatting polka with Her Majesty.
crispycandy
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This is so stupid. Russia went in to Goergia to defend Ossettia and the americans turned the story around and said that Russia entered Georgia to start a war..
This is so typicall of America to butt in, they had no place in it whatso ever...
but know i suppose everything will change
hopefully this wont be the start of WWIII
peace.
This is so typicall of America to butt in, they had no place in it whatso ever...
but know i suppose everything will change
hopefully this wont be the start of WWIII
peace.
Starcraftmazter
Member
Fortunately, America has not held the morale high ground in a long time.crispycandy said:
http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-United-States-has-lost-by-Mary-MacElveen-080814-566.html
Who will most people believe, the country which has invaded many others in recent times, or the country which has invaded nobody in recent years?
Of course most people support Russia, since they see through the BS.
http://georgia-vs-russia.com/
You can see that even most Americans, Brits, Israelis and obviously everyone else (apart from a fascist Baltic state, and obviously Georgia) supports Russia over Georgia.
Last edited:
Slidey
But pieces of what?
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You sound like one of those Muslims or Christians that tries to convince people god exists by showing them "scientifically proven miracles" and making wild sweeping statements like "all scientists secretly know they're true but try to hide them from the public".Starcraftmazter said:
Well done old chap, I commend you.
Starcraftmazter
Member
Slidey, I found your post...amusing.
writer'sblock
Member
ON THE night of August 7th, Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia’s president, embarked on an ill-judged assault on South Ossetia, one of his country’s two breakaway enclaves. Russian tanks, troops and aircraft poured across the border. Just five days later, after pulverising the Georgian armed forces, Russia announced that it was ending its operations.
This brutal and efficient move was a victory for Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president-turned-prime-minister, not just over Georgia but also over the West, which has been trying to prise away countries on Russia’s western borders and turn them democratic, market-oriented and friendly. Now that Russia has shown what can happen to those that distance themselves from it, doing so will be harder in future.
Living next to the bear
Russia has made perfunctory attempts to justify the invasion. It claimed that it was defending Russian citizens. This excuse, as Sweden’s foreign minister tartly noted, recalled Hitler’s justifications of Nazi invasions. Anyway, most of the “Russian citizens” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had been handed their passports fairly recently, presumably in preparation for this foray.
Similarly, Russian attempts to draw analogies with NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 and its encouragement of Kosovo’s independence, or with the American-led invasion of Iraq, do not wash. The latest fighting in South Ossetia may have been triggered by the Georgians, but it was largely engineered by the Russians, who have, over the years, fanned the flames of the conflict. As for the Iraqi parallel, not even the Russians pretend that Mr Saakashvili has ever been a threat to his neighbours and to the world.
This was no sudden response to provocation, but a long-planned move. Mr Putin resents the West’s influence in former Soviet countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, and he dislikes the puckish Mr Saakashvili intensely. He may not yet have ousted him (indeed, ordinary Georgians have rallied to support their president—so far). But by thumping down Russia’s military fist in the Caucasus, he has made clear that Russia will not tolerate excessive signs of independence from its neighbours, including bids to join the NATO alliance.
This new Russian imperialism is bad news for all its neighbours. Mr Saakashvili is an impetuous nationalist who has lately tarnished his democratic credentials. His venture into South Ossetia was foolish and possibly criminal. But, unlike Mr Putin, he has led his country in a broadly democratic direction, curbed corruption and presided over rapid economic growth that has not relied, as Russia’s mostly does, on high oil and gas prices. America’s George Bush was right, if rather slow, to declare on August 11th that it was unacceptable in the 21st century for Russia to have invaded a sovereign neighbouring state and to threaten a democratically elected government.
Yet the hard truth, for Georgians and others, is that pleas for military backing from the West in any confrontation with Russia are unlikely to be heeded. The Americans gave Mr Saakashvili token help when they transported Georgian troops home from Iraq (where 2,000 of them made up the third-largest allied contingent). And they have now sent in humanitarian aid in military aircraft and ships. But nobody is willing to risk a wider war with Russia over its claimed near-abroad. Among Russia’s immediate neighbours, only the Baltic states, which slipped into NATO when Russia was weak, can claim such protection.
That does not mean the West should do nothing in response to Russia’s aggression against Georgia. On the contrary, it still has influence over the Russians, who remain surprisingly sensitive about their international image. That is why Western leaders must make quite clear their outrage over the invasion and continued bombing of Georgia. Few have done that so far; the Italians and Germans in particular have been shamefully silent.
Above all, the West must make plain to Mr Putin that Russia’s invasion of Georgia means an end to business as usual, even if it continues to work with him on issues such as Iran. America has already cancelled some military exercises with Russia. America and the Europeans should ensure that Russia is not let into more international clubs, such as the Paris-based OECD or the World Trade Organisation. Now would also be an appropriate time to strengthen the rich-country G7, which excludes Russia, at the expense of the G8, which includes it.
The European Union, which has too often split into camps of appeasers and tough-talkers over Russia, should drop negotiations on a new partnership and co-operation agreement. Visa restrictions should be tightened, and the personal finances abroad of top Russian officials probed more carefully. The EU should work harder at reducing its dependence on Russian energy imports and improving internal energy connections—and EU countries should stop striking bilateral deals with Russia.
In the short term, none of this is likely to deter Russia from reasserting itself in the Caucasus if it feels inclined to do so. Together, though, such measures might give Mr Putin pause before trying anything similar elsewhere—for instance in Crimea, a part of Ukraine that is home not only to many thousands of Russians but also to Russia’s Black Sea fleet. The clearer the West’s displeasure, the better the chances of getting peacekeepers and monitors from other countries into Abkhazia and South Ossetia to replace the Russian troops which have been there as peacekeepers since 2004, but which should leave as they are now clearly occupying forces.
Most importantly, although Mr Saakashvili’s foolishness makes admitting Georgia harder, Russia’s incursion should not delay plans to let Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. Russia’s aggression will make these countries, and others, keener than ever on joining. The worst outcome of this war would be for the West to allow Russia a veto over any sovereign country’s membership of either NATO or the EU.
This brutal and efficient move was a victory for Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president-turned-prime-minister, not just over Georgia but also over the West, which has been trying to prise away countries on Russia’s western borders and turn them democratic, market-oriented and friendly. Now that Russia has shown what can happen to those that distance themselves from it, doing so will be harder in future.
Living next to the bear
Russia has made perfunctory attempts to justify the invasion. It claimed that it was defending Russian citizens. This excuse, as Sweden’s foreign minister tartly noted, recalled Hitler’s justifications of Nazi invasions. Anyway, most of the “Russian citizens” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had been handed their passports fairly recently, presumably in preparation for this foray.
Similarly, Russian attempts to draw analogies with NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 and its encouragement of Kosovo’s independence, or with the American-led invasion of Iraq, do not wash. The latest fighting in South Ossetia may have been triggered by the Georgians, but it was largely engineered by the Russians, who have, over the years, fanned the flames of the conflict. As for the Iraqi parallel, not even the Russians pretend that Mr Saakashvili has ever been a threat to his neighbours and to the world.
This was no sudden response to provocation, but a long-planned move. Mr Putin resents the West’s influence in former Soviet countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, and he dislikes the puckish Mr Saakashvili intensely. He may not yet have ousted him (indeed, ordinary Georgians have rallied to support their president—so far). But by thumping down Russia’s military fist in the Caucasus, he has made clear that Russia will not tolerate excessive signs of independence from its neighbours, including bids to join the NATO alliance.
This new Russian imperialism is bad news for all its neighbours. Mr Saakashvili is an impetuous nationalist who has lately tarnished his democratic credentials. His venture into South Ossetia was foolish and possibly criminal. But, unlike Mr Putin, he has led his country in a broadly democratic direction, curbed corruption and presided over rapid economic growth that has not relied, as Russia’s mostly does, on high oil and gas prices. America’s George Bush was right, if rather slow, to declare on August 11th that it was unacceptable in the 21st century for Russia to have invaded a sovereign neighbouring state and to threaten a democratically elected government.
Yet the hard truth, for Georgians and others, is that pleas for military backing from the West in any confrontation with Russia are unlikely to be heeded. The Americans gave Mr Saakashvili token help when they transported Georgian troops home from Iraq (where 2,000 of them made up the third-largest allied contingent). And they have now sent in humanitarian aid in military aircraft and ships. But nobody is willing to risk a wider war with Russia over its claimed near-abroad. Among Russia’s immediate neighbours, only the Baltic states, which slipped into NATO when Russia was weak, can claim such protection.
That does not mean the West should do nothing in response to Russia’s aggression against Georgia. On the contrary, it still has influence over the Russians, who remain surprisingly sensitive about their international image. That is why Western leaders must make quite clear their outrage over the invasion and continued bombing of Georgia. Few have done that so far; the Italians and Germans in particular have been shamefully silent.
Above all, the West must make plain to Mr Putin that Russia’s invasion of Georgia means an end to business as usual, even if it continues to work with him on issues such as Iran. America has already cancelled some military exercises with Russia. America and the Europeans should ensure that Russia is not let into more international clubs, such as the Paris-based OECD or the World Trade Organisation. Now would also be an appropriate time to strengthen the rich-country G7, which excludes Russia, at the expense of the G8, which includes it.
The European Union, which has too often split into camps of appeasers and tough-talkers over Russia, should drop negotiations on a new partnership and co-operation agreement. Visa restrictions should be tightened, and the personal finances abroad of top Russian officials probed more carefully. The EU should work harder at reducing its dependence on Russian energy imports and improving internal energy connections—and EU countries should stop striking bilateral deals with Russia.
In the short term, none of this is likely to deter Russia from reasserting itself in the Caucasus if it feels inclined to do so. Together, though, such measures might give Mr Putin pause before trying anything similar elsewhere—for instance in Crimea, a part of Ukraine that is home not only to many thousands of Russians but also to Russia’s Black Sea fleet. The clearer the West’s displeasure, the better the chances of getting peacekeepers and monitors from other countries into Abkhazia and South Ossetia to replace the Russian troops which have been there as peacekeepers since 2004, but which should leave as they are now clearly occupying forces.
Most importantly, although Mr Saakashvili’s foolishness makes admitting Georgia harder, Russia’s incursion should not delay plans to let Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. Russia’s aggression will make these countries, and others, keener than ever on joining. The worst outcome of this war would be for the West to allow Russia a veto over any sovereign country’s membership of either NATO or the EU.
writer'sblock
Member
There is no quick fix, but an over-confident Russia is weaker than it looks
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]FROM Brussels this week NATO brandished a fist at Russia, warning it that there could be no “business as usual” so long as Russian forces remained in Georgia. The Russians, oddly, did not quail. If anything, President Dmitry Medvedev and his mentor and prime minister, Vladimir Putin, seem to be enjoying the world’s impotent indignation in the face of their new-found machismo. And why not? They know that the West will not fight for the territorial integrity of Georgia, a trisected statelet of only 4m people in the faraway Caucasus. They also know that they will face no serious economic punishment. As a collective, NATO may huff and puff, but the cold fact is that many of its big members need a lot of business with Russia to continue. Germany and others in Europe need to keep buying Russia’s oil and gas. America needs Russia, too, in order to secure vital foreign-policy objectives of its own, such as preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.[/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]Does this mean that Russia will get away with its smash-and-grab operation? In one sense it does. Russia’s intentions were unclear this week; it drove some tanks here and there for the benefit of the cameras. But if it is determined to keep its forces in Georgia proper despite the ceasefire agreement brokered by France, Germany and America, it is hard to see what any outsider can do about it. Georgia’s dispute with Russia would then once again become a “frozen” conflict, except with different de facto borders.[/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]The wider aims with which Russia is presumed to have entered Georgia have not yet been achieved, however. They include toppling its pro-American president, Mikheil Saakashvili, and using intimidation to stop Georgia and Ukraine from following the Poles, Czechs, Balts and other former dominions of the Soviet Union into the orbit of the West and thence into NATO. If it pursues sound policies, the West still stands a fair chance, despite its divisions, of thwarting these aims. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]Sound policy starts with a sense of proportion. Contrary to some excitable first reactions, Russia’s ability to crush the minuscule Georgian army does not make it a superpower, and its aggression in the Caucasus need not mark the start of a new cold war. To put things in perspective, America’s GDP is ten times bigger than Russia’s and it spends at least seven times more on defence. Russia’s economy would fall off a cliff if energy prices slumped and its population, racked by ill-health and inequality, is shrinking by up to 800,000 a year. Russia can make mischief, but it cannot project military and ideological power all around the world, as the Soviet Union did during the cold war. Although it scares some neighbours (but not the Chinese), its threats make them all the more determined to stay on guard. It is surely no coincidence that after months of prevarication the Poles agreed immediately after Russia invaded Georgia to let America base missile defences (ostensibly against a future threat from Iran) on Polish territory. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]To say that Russia’s strength is exaggerated is not to say that it should be allowed to escape its Georgian adventure unpunished. A weak power can be more reckless than a strong one. Russia needs to learn that in spite of their own enervating foreign wars and economic worries the members of the Western alliance can still unite in front of a challenge. But because Russia is fundamentally less strong than it likes to pretend, the West’s response can afford to be patient as well as principled. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]One principle the West must insist on is the legitimacy of Georgia’s government. However foolish Mr Saakashvili was to give Russia a pretext for invasion, he should stay in office until Georgians themselves throw him out. Another principle is the right of any country, even if it is a former Soviet vassal in what Russia still counts as its own sphere of influence, to ask to join NATO. Naturally, the alliance should not admit members who are unready, or for whom it is not in the end willing to fight. On this test, Georgia might never get in. But to give Russia a veto would be to mock the sovereignty of small countries. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana, geneva, arial, sans serif]Just wait[/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]As to patience, suspending business as usual should not be pushed to the point that drives Russia into the sort of sulk that will make its behaviour worse. Finding the line between disapproval, pressure and continued engagement will be hard. Too much concern for the hurt feelings of a fallen empire could be misread as weakness and so encourage further bullying. But there is vital work to be done—on nuclear proliferation and arms reduction, for example—in which the need for co-operation with Russia simply outweighs the need to punish it. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]So Russia will keep its tanks in Georgia if it wants to. But the longer it does so, the less Europe will want to rely on Russia for its energy, the longer it will wait to join the World Trade Organisation, the more hostile the next American president will be and the more its nervous neighbours will be tempted to turn to the West for safety. The job now is to explain to Russia that this may not have been such a victory for machismo, after all. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]FROM Brussels this week NATO brandished a fist at Russia, warning it that there could be no “business as usual” so long as Russian forces remained in Georgia. The Russians, oddly, did not quail. If anything, President Dmitry Medvedev and his mentor and prime minister, Vladimir Putin, seem to be enjoying the world’s impotent indignation in the face of their new-found machismo. And why not? They know that the West will not fight for the territorial integrity of Georgia, a trisected statelet of only 4m people in the faraway Caucasus. They also know that they will face no serious economic punishment. As a collective, NATO may huff and puff, but the cold fact is that many of its big members need a lot of business with Russia to continue. Germany and others in Europe need to keep buying Russia’s oil and gas. America needs Russia, too, in order to secure vital foreign-policy objectives of its own, such as preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.[/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]Does this mean that Russia will get away with its smash-and-grab operation? In one sense it does. Russia’s intentions were unclear this week; it drove some tanks here and there for the benefit of the cameras. But if it is determined to keep its forces in Georgia proper despite the ceasefire agreement brokered by France, Germany and America, it is hard to see what any outsider can do about it. Georgia’s dispute with Russia would then once again become a “frozen” conflict, except with different de facto borders.[/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]The wider aims with which Russia is presumed to have entered Georgia have not yet been achieved, however. They include toppling its pro-American president, Mikheil Saakashvili, and using intimidation to stop Georgia and Ukraine from following the Poles, Czechs, Balts and other former dominions of the Soviet Union into the orbit of the West and thence into NATO. If it pursues sound policies, the West still stands a fair chance, despite its divisions, of thwarting these aims. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]Sound policy starts with a sense of proportion. Contrary to some excitable first reactions, Russia’s ability to crush the minuscule Georgian army does not make it a superpower, and its aggression in the Caucasus need not mark the start of a new cold war. To put things in perspective, America’s GDP is ten times bigger than Russia’s and it spends at least seven times more on defence. Russia’s economy would fall off a cliff if energy prices slumped and its population, racked by ill-health and inequality, is shrinking by up to 800,000 a year. Russia can make mischief, but it cannot project military and ideological power all around the world, as the Soviet Union did during the cold war. Although it scares some neighbours (but not the Chinese), its threats make them all the more determined to stay on guard. It is surely no coincidence that after months of prevarication the Poles agreed immediately after Russia invaded Georgia to let America base missile defences (ostensibly against a future threat from Iran) on Polish territory. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]To say that Russia’s strength is exaggerated is not to say that it should be allowed to escape its Georgian adventure unpunished. A weak power can be more reckless than a strong one. Russia needs to learn that in spite of their own enervating foreign wars and economic worries the members of the Western alliance can still unite in front of a challenge. But because Russia is fundamentally less strong than it likes to pretend, the West’s response can afford to be patient as well as principled. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]One principle the West must insist on is the legitimacy of Georgia’s government. However foolish Mr Saakashvili was to give Russia a pretext for invasion, he should stay in office until Georgians themselves throw him out. Another principle is the right of any country, even if it is a former Soviet vassal in what Russia still counts as its own sphere of influence, to ask to join NATO. Naturally, the alliance should not admit members who are unready, or for whom it is not in the end willing to fight. On this test, Georgia might never get in. But to give Russia a veto would be to mock the sovereignty of small countries. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana, geneva, arial, sans serif]Just wait[/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]As to patience, suspending business as usual should not be pushed to the point that drives Russia into the sort of sulk that will make its behaviour worse. Finding the line between disapproval, pressure and continued engagement will be hard. Too much concern for the hurt feelings of a fallen empire could be misread as weakness and so encourage further bullying. But there is vital work to be done—on nuclear proliferation and arms reduction, for example—in which the need for co-operation with Russia simply outweighs the need to punish it. [/FONT]
[FONT=verdana,geneva,arial,sans serif]So Russia will keep its tanks in Georgia if it wants to. But the longer it does so, the less Europe will want to rely on Russia for its energy, the longer it will wait to join the World Trade Organisation, the more hostile the next American president will be and the more its nervous neighbours will be tempted to turn to the West for safety. The job now is to explain to Russia that this may not have been such a victory for machismo, after all. [/FONT]
writer'sblock
Member
IN LESS than two weeks—from the first heated discussion about Russia’s push into Georgia that took place between President George Bush and Russia’s prime minister, Vladimir Putin, at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, to the supposed start on August 19th of the Russian army’s rifle-dragging withdrawal—the geopolitical map of Europe has been redrawn. Swathes of Georgia, not just the enclave of South Ossetia, the proximate cause of the fighting, are in Russian hands. Surprised and shocked by the outbreak of war over a place few of their citizens had ever heard of, Western governments have scrambled to cover their divisions over how to respond. Yet for all its triumphalist taunts that “Russia is back”, there is no gold medal for the Kremlin for invading a neighbour for the first time since the end of the cold war.
The immediate damage to Russia’s relations with America and Europe is clear from NATO’s decision to suspend co-operation with the Kremlin until its “disproportionate” action ends and its troops are back in the positions they held before the fighting erupted on August 7th. Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, who is Mr Putin’s hand-picked successor, now says this will be done by August 22nd. But it is Mr Putin and the generals who call the shots—and they mutter that the Georgians have “not given up on their aggressive intentions.”
Mr Bush has already cancelled military exercises with Russia and withdrawn from Congress a civilian nuclear co-operation agreement that could potentially have netted Russia’s atomic industry billions. High-level visits have been put on hold. There is to be a fundamental review of relations with Russia. Beyond that, Russia’s hopes of getting into the World Trade Organisation this year have been dashed: Georgia, among others, would block it. Some, including John McCain, the Republican candidate in America’s presidential election, talk of expelling Russia from the G8 group of rich and supposedly responsible countries; others of diluting its influence by inviting China and others to join.
Some European governments have puffed hot, some cold over all this. But Germany’s Angela Merkel, often in the cautious camp when it comes to dealings with Russia because of her country’s extensive business and energy ties, has spoken with increasing sharpness of Russia’s obligations under the ceasefire agreement that she helped to nail down. Meanwhile the repercussions of this small war in the Caucasus will spread a lot wider.
The (dis)honours are shared. Georgia’s youthful president, Mikheil Saakashvili, made a terrible mistake in ordering attacks on civilian targets in South Ossetia on August 7th. NATO has set up a special commission with Georgia to oversee reconstruction and to help the country eventually fulfil its aspirations for membership, which Russia fiercely opposes. Yet Mr Saakashvili’s actions have made Georgia’s path longer and steeper. Once Russian troops go, the anger of ordinary Georgians at the catastrophe that has befallen their country may yet turn on the man who got them into this mess.
Mr Putin would count Mr Saakashvili’s scalp as another victory. Polls suggest that Russia’s leaders have popular backing at home. But Russia has also miscalculated by marching its troops into Georgia proper. That has lost it the propaganda war abroad, with the television pictures conjuring up memories of Prague in 1968 and, more recently, of Chechnya.
Russia’s interests will not go unscathed. Ukraine, another NATO candidate some day, far from being cowed by Georgia’s fate, promptly offered America and the Europeans access to its air-defence radars. Belarus, usually tightly allied with the Kremlin, took almost two weeks to declare its support; other neighbours have stayed stumm. Behind the cover of the Olympic celebrations, it will not have gone unnoticed in Beijing that China’s ally at the United Nations in opposing “interference” in a sovereign country’s affairs has just worryingly stepped over the line.
The new low in Russia’s relations with the West is one of a dispiriting series. Russia’s failed attempts to shape the outcome of Ukraine’s presidential election in 2004, followed by the orange revolution there (after Georgia’s rose revolution in 2003), hit a nerve with Mr Putin. Resentment that simmered at the continued expansion of NATO, and America’s plans to site parts of its missile defences in the Czech Republic and Poland, then boiled over after the announcement at NATO’s summit in Bucharest in April that both Georgia and Ukraine could one day join the alliance, albeit only when they were ready. Both Russia and Georgia were left itching for a fight.
That it came to one only makes difficult things harder. One is the effort to keep Europe, America, Russia and China united in the face of Iran’s defiance of UN calls for a suspension of its suspected nuclear activity. Another is the bid to resurrect an amended Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Russia stopped co-operating with CFE limits on troop movements last year. Shortly before the Georgia crisis, it came up with suggested troop limits that it could live with. The new chill will also kill Mr Medvedev’s proposed Treaty on European Security, an idea that a British official says now looks “slightly absurd”.
Efforts to overcome Russia’s objections to missile defences in eastern Europe will also suffer. It has slammed America’s new agreement with Poland and frozen its own links with NATO. It might have done this anyway, but the shape of a deal to address some of Russia’s fears about the system was in sight, argues Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. Now the next American president will find it harder to make the compromises needed to get Russia involved.
Indeed, in the run-up to the inauguration of a new American president in January, scores of think-tanks, commissions and working groups have been beavering away on advice for the next incumbent of the White House. Democrats in particular have been looking for ways for an Obama presidency to broaden relations with Russia, which they argue have been neglected, except in narrow nuclear matters, by the Bush administration. There is much nuclear work still to be done, including agreeing upon a new round of cuts in strategic arsenals. But they are now scratching their heads. How to take account of Russia’s interests, when its idea of respect from the outside world is based on fear?
The immediate damage to Russia’s relations with America and Europe is clear from NATO’s decision to suspend co-operation with the Kremlin until its “disproportionate” action ends and its troops are back in the positions they held before the fighting erupted on August 7th. Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, who is Mr Putin’s hand-picked successor, now says this will be done by August 22nd. But it is Mr Putin and the generals who call the shots—and they mutter that the Georgians have “not given up on their aggressive intentions.”
Mr Bush has already cancelled military exercises with Russia and withdrawn from Congress a civilian nuclear co-operation agreement that could potentially have netted Russia’s atomic industry billions. High-level visits have been put on hold. There is to be a fundamental review of relations with Russia. Beyond that, Russia’s hopes of getting into the World Trade Organisation this year have been dashed: Georgia, among others, would block it. Some, including John McCain, the Republican candidate in America’s presidential election, talk of expelling Russia from the G8 group of rich and supposedly responsible countries; others of diluting its influence by inviting China and others to join.
Some European governments have puffed hot, some cold over all this. But Germany’s Angela Merkel, often in the cautious camp when it comes to dealings with Russia because of her country’s extensive business and energy ties, has spoken with increasing sharpness of Russia’s obligations under the ceasefire agreement that she helped to nail down. Meanwhile the repercussions of this small war in the Caucasus will spread a lot wider.
The (dis)honours are shared. Georgia’s youthful president, Mikheil Saakashvili, made a terrible mistake in ordering attacks on civilian targets in South Ossetia on August 7th. NATO has set up a special commission with Georgia to oversee reconstruction and to help the country eventually fulfil its aspirations for membership, which Russia fiercely opposes. Yet Mr Saakashvili’s actions have made Georgia’s path longer and steeper. Once Russian troops go, the anger of ordinary Georgians at the catastrophe that has befallen their country may yet turn on the man who got them into this mess.
Mr Putin would count Mr Saakashvili’s scalp as another victory. Polls suggest that Russia’s leaders have popular backing at home. But Russia has also miscalculated by marching its troops into Georgia proper. That has lost it the propaganda war abroad, with the television pictures conjuring up memories of Prague in 1968 and, more recently, of Chechnya.
Russia’s interests will not go unscathed. Ukraine, another NATO candidate some day, far from being cowed by Georgia’s fate, promptly offered America and the Europeans access to its air-defence radars. Belarus, usually tightly allied with the Kremlin, took almost two weeks to declare its support; other neighbours have stayed stumm. Behind the cover of the Olympic celebrations, it will not have gone unnoticed in Beijing that China’s ally at the United Nations in opposing “interference” in a sovereign country’s affairs has just worryingly stepped over the line.
The new low in Russia’s relations with the West is one of a dispiriting series. Russia’s failed attempts to shape the outcome of Ukraine’s presidential election in 2004, followed by the orange revolution there (after Georgia’s rose revolution in 2003), hit a nerve with Mr Putin. Resentment that simmered at the continued expansion of NATO, and America’s plans to site parts of its missile defences in the Czech Republic and Poland, then boiled over after the announcement at NATO’s summit in Bucharest in April that both Georgia and Ukraine could one day join the alliance, albeit only when they were ready. Both Russia and Georgia were left itching for a fight.
That it came to one only makes difficult things harder. One is the effort to keep Europe, America, Russia and China united in the face of Iran’s defiance of UN calls for a suspension of its suspected nuclear activity. Another is the bid to resurrect an amended Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Russia stopped co-operating with CFE limits on troop movements last year. Shortly before the Georgia crisis, it came up with suggested troop limits that it could live with. The new chill will also kill Mr Medvedev’s proposed Treaty on European Security, an idea that a British official says now looks “slightly absurd”.
Efforts to overcome Russia’s objections to missile defences in eastern Europe will also suffer. It has slammed America’s new agreement with Poland and frozen its own links with NATO. It might have done this anyway, but the shape of a deal to address some of Russia’s fears about the system was in sight, argues Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. Now the next American president will find it harder to make the compromises needed to get Russia involved.
Indeed, in the run-up to the inauguration of a new American president in January, scores of think-tanks, commissions and working groups have been beavering away on advice for the next incumbent of the White House. Democrats in particular have been looking for ways for an Obama presidency to broaden relations with Russia, which they argue have been neglected, except in narrow nuclear matters, by the Bush administration. There is much nuclear work still to be done, including agreeing upon a new round of cuts in strategic arsenals. But they are now scratching their heads. How to take account of Russia’s interests, when its idea of respect from the outside world is based on fear?
bigboyjames
Banned
slidey is one of those fagots on here who listens to Bill O'Reilly every night...then goes into his room to jerk off.
TacoTerrorist
Member
Bill o'Reilly is the biggest moron in history. I'm throwing a party when the old prick finally falls off the perch.
Aryanbeauty
Member
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,412483,00.html :rofl: Poor and isolated Russia
Lets hope Iran and Venezuela to support Russia LOL!
Starcraftmazter
Member
Poor and isolated? You actually think they care? Wow....
You do realise Russia is the #1 supplier of arms and energy to the world? The fuck would they care what a bunch of hypocrites think? You actually think anyone is going to stop them?
Ahahahahaa...
You do realise Russia is the #1 supplier of arms and energy to the world? The fuck would they care what a bunch of hypocrites think? You actually think anyone is going to stop them?
Ahahahahaa...
Aryanbeauty
Member
Apparently they do, thats why they cried and begged for Chinese support, only to be rebuffed ha haStarcraftmazter said: