c_james
Viva La Merchandise!
- Joined
- Mar 15, 2004
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- 2005
If someone wouldn't mind, a critique on this source effectiveness response would be much appreciated. It was from the 2005 Independent Trial (I did the CSSA), and I've typed out the sources for your convenience. Reason I didn't put this in the WWI forum is because this place is dead enough as it is...
Source C
Statement by the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, issued in August 1914
In defence against a totally unjustified attack by our enemies, I have been forced to go to war…with a clear conscience concerning the cause of this War, I am certain that our cause before God is just. We have been forced to defend the Fatherland (Germany) because of aggressive action by our enemies. Our defence will require a sacrifice of men and resources.
Source D
Extract from a British propaganda leaflet dropped into German trenches by balloon in 1917
They tell you that you are fighting for the Fatherland. Have you ever thought why you are fighting?
You are fighting to glorify Hindenburg, to enrich Krupp (a wealthy German industrialist). You are struggling for the Kaiser, the Junkers (German landowning aristocrats), and the militarists…
They promise you victory and peace. You poor fool! It was promised your comrades for more than three years. They have indeed found peace, deep in the grave, but victory did not come!
It is for the Fatherland…but what is your Fatherland? Is it the Crown Prince (heir to the German throne) who offered up 600,000 men at Verdun? Is it Hindenburg, who with Ludendorff is many kilometers behind the front lines making more plans to give the English more cannon fodder? Is it Krupp for whom each year of war means millions of marks? Is it the German Junkers who still cry over your dead bodies for more annexations?
No, none of these is the Fatherland. You are the Fatherland…
Assess how useful sources C and D would be for an historian studying propaganda during World War I.
In your answer, consider the perspectives provided by both sources, and the reliability of each one.
Sources C and D provide useful insights into the nature and effectiveness of propaganda, as used by both Germany and Britain, during World War I. Each, however, has its objectivity undermined by the political interests and context of its time.
Source C, a statement released by Kaiser Wilhelm II, was written with the political motive of rallying the masses behind the German war effort and depicting the conflict as a ‘justus bellum’ or ‘just war’, as evidenced by the Kaiser’s references to a “clear conscience” and “our cause before God”. The 1914 German perspective is particularly useful to an historian attempting to gain insights into pre-total war propaganda, which they can identify as having heavily drawn on fervent nationalism and the popular idea at the time that Germany was ‘encircled’ by enemies and had no choice but to wage war – “we have been forced to defend the Fatherland”. The reliability of the source, however, is undermined by its fundamentally propagative and didactic intent to raise support for the war effort. Nevertheless, the historian is afforded valuable insights into the rhetoric typical of the time’s propaganda efforts (especially upon the outbreak of war, before the presence of widespread disillusionment and disenchantment as a result of attrition). The perspective of the Kaiser, while obviously one of political interest and expedience, is one which proves to be a reliable cross-section of the people’s. The source highlights for the historian the self-justifying nature of German propaganda from the useful, though obviously not wholly reliable, perspective of the leadership.
Source D, an extract from a British propaganda leaflet dropped in 1917, is better understood through and examination of its context. Having been written in 1917, a bad year for the Allies owing to Russian withdrawal from the war and the massive losses of Passchendaele, the source evidences how, even in times of peril, British propaganda was systematically used to wear down the morale and will of German soldiers. Indeed, German soldiers were angered by the better state of British trenches and her comparatively stable homefront during the war. The reliability of the source, in line with its propagative nature and intent to foster disunity and possibly cause mutiny within the German forces, is clearly tenuous and does not provide a truly objective account of events. For example, although it draws the attention of German soldiers to the “crown prince who offered up 600,000 men at Verdun”, it conveniently neglects to mention that the French lost 400,000 men in the battle and had their honour shattered (Verdun was a symbol of French eminence), and that as a result the Battle of the Somme (1916) was disastrously brought forward. Thus, the source highlights for the historian how British propaganda relied just as much on the exclusion of information as it did the inclusion. The British perspective of the source is one of logic and rationality – realising that German soldiers were primarily from the lower echelons of society, the source dwells on the detested upper-class “Junkers”, “industrialists” such as Krupp, and the Kaiser. The effectiveness of the propaganda is attributable to coordinated British propaganda efforts through the War Propaganda Bureau (WPB) – German efforts were privately run and ad hoc.
Source C
Statement by the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, issued in August 1914
In defence against a totally unjustified attack by our enemies, I have been forced to go to war…with a clear conscience concerning the cause of this War, I am certain that our cause before God is just. We have been forced to defend the Fatherland (Germany) because of aggressive action by our enemies. Our defence will require a sacrifice of men and resources.
Source D
Extract from a British propaganda leaflet dropped into German trenches by balloon in 1917
They tell you that you are fighting for the Fatherland. Have you ever thought why you are fighting?
You are fighting to glorify Hindenburg, to enrich Krupp (a wealthy German industrialist). You are struggling for the Kaiser, the Junkers (German landowning aristocrats), and the militarists…
They promise you victory and peace. You poor fool! It was promised your comrades for more than three years. They have indeed found peace, deep in the grave, but victory did not come!
It is for the Fatherland…but what is your Fatherland? Is it the Crown Prince (heir to the German throne) who offered up 600,000 men at Verdun? Is it Hindenburg, who with Ludendorff is many kilometers behind the front lines making more plans to give the English more cannon fodder? Is it Krupp for whom each year of war means millions of marks? Is it the German Junkers who still cry over your dead bodies for more annexations?
No, none of these is the Fatherland. You are the Fatherland…
Assess how useful sources C and D would be for an historian studying propaganda during World War I.
In your answer, consider the perspectives provided by both sources, and the reliability of each one.
Sources C and D provide useful insights into the nature and effectiveness of propaganda, as used by both Germany and Britain, during World War I. Each, however, has its objectivity undermined by the political interests and context of its time.
Source C, a statement released by Kaiser Wilhelm II, was written with the political motive of rallying the masses behind the German war effort and depicting the conflict as a ‘justus bellum’ or ‘just war’, as evidenced by the Kaiser’s references to a “clear conscience” and “our cause before God”. The 1914 German perspective is particularly useful to an historian attempting to gain insights into pre-total war propaganda, which they can identify as having heavily drawn on fervent nationalism and the popular idea at the time that Germany was ‘encircled’ by enemies and had no choice but to wage war – “we have been forced to defend the Fatherland”. The reliability of the source, however, is undermined by its fundamentally propagative and didactic intent to raise support for the war effort. Nevertheless, the historian is afforded valuable insights into the rhetoric typical of the time’s propaganda efforts (especially upon the outbreak of war, before the presence of widespread disillusionment and disenchantment as a result of attrition). The perspective of the Kaiser, while obviously one of political interest and expedience, is one which proves to be a reliable cross-section of the people’s. The source highlights for the historian the self-justifying nature of German propaganda from the useful, though obviously not wholly reliable, perspective of the leadership.
Source D, an extract from a British propaganda leaflet dropped in 1917, is better understood through and examination of its context. Having been written in 1917, a bad year for the Allies owing to Russian withdrawal from the war and the massive losses of Passchendaele, the source evidences how, even in times of peril, British propaganda was systematically used to wear down the morale and will of German soldiers. Indeed, German soldiers were angered by the better state of British trenches and her comparatively stable homefront during the war. The reliability of the source, in line with its propagative nature and intent to foster disunity and possibly cause mutiny within the German forces, is clearly tenuous and does not provide a truly objective account of events. For example, although it draws the attention of German soldiers to the “crown prince who offered up 600,000 men at Verdun”, it conveniently neglects to mention that the French lost 400,000 men in the battle and had their honour shattered (Verdun was a symbol of French eminence), and that as a result the Battle of the Somme (1916) was disastrously brought forward. Thus, the source highlights for the historian how British propaganda relied just as much on the exclusion of information as it did the inclusion. The British perspective of the source is one of logic and rationality – realising that German soldiers were primarily from the lower echelons of society, the source dwells on the detested upper-class “Junkers”, “industrialists” such as Krupp, and the Kaiser. The effectiveness of the propaganda is attributable to coordinated British propaganda efforts through the War Propaganda Bureau (WPB) – German efforts were privately run and ad hoc.
