Multiple Choice (2 Viewers)

[Spiritual Being]

Wait, when you say that the Governor General is 'responsible' for assent, can't she also decide to NOT give a bill royal assent? Thus, she 'reviews' over the legislation and decides whether or not she will give it royal assent. And when you say the GG can 'change it' are you referring to the bill?

This is true.

 

[Spiritual Being]

True - nothing is really known with BoS considering some of these answers are quite close, can't change anything now so just hope for the best

Seriously, half of these guys are arguing about something that's already decided. I get the point for an exam thoughts thread to share a brief opinion, but no need to dissect each question to pieces and have a judicial argument where no lawyer dare venture.

 

[iPwned3]

Also, I just found this in the Constitution (specifically section 58): "The Governor‑General may return to the house in which it originated any proposed law so presented to him, and may transmit therewith any amendments which he may recommend, and the Houses may deal with the recommendation."
So he/she can DECIDE to NOT give it royal assent.

EDIT: AustLii link haha: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/coaca430/s58.html

 

[BigD787]

Also, I just found this in the Constitution (specifically section 58): "The Governor‑General may return to the house in which it originated any proposed law so presented to him, and may transmit therewith any amendments which he may recommend, and the Houses may deal with the recommendation."
So he/she can DECIDE to NOT give it royal assent.

EDIT: AustLii link haha: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/coaca430/s58.html

True, however you've got to look at the syllabus on executive branch (e.g. police), and the role of executive is to APPLY or Enforce law, Answer B

 

[Spiritual Being]

While, in justifying the disallowance of the ACT legislation, the Attorney-General stressed — and mischaracterized — the constitutional, legal, question, the Prime Minister emphasised the moral, normative, question: marriage had to be preserved as a heterosexual institution.The Greens took issue with this justification for disallowing the Act: 'The only explanation offered is that civil unions would "undermine" marriage, but they cannot explain how this would actually happen.' Indeed, Labor, as we have seen, was apparently prepared to support the legislation partly because it believed it did not impact on marriage as a heterosexual institution.

The government and the opposition disagreed about the proposition that recognising same-sex civil unions would have the effect of undermining heterosexual marriage. They both took for granted one point, however: that marriage should remain heterosexual, apparently because they believe that the value of the institution is somehow bound up with its heterosexual character.Whether or not the value of marriage is inseparable from its heterosexuality is not only the logically antecedent question in the debate over civil unions, but also a fundamental moral question relevant to the issue of the legal recognition of SSM. As we have seen, assuming that CM includes SSM, the Commonwealth could use the marriage power to render inoperative State SSM statutes. But should it?

Given the paucity, tautological character and lack of sophistication of the justifications provided by the government for keeping marriage heterosexual, one has to look elsewhere in order to make sense of the proposition that the value of the institution is somehow inseparable from its heterosexual character. New Natural Law theory provides the most elaborate theory of marriage among those seeking to justify the value of the institution in a way that poses the different sex of the spouses as central to what counts as (valuable) marriage. Further, New Natural Law theorists themselves have claimed that their 'account [of marriage] also articulates thoughts which have historically been implicit in the judgements of many non-philosophical people'. The plausibility of this claim seems to be borne out by the similarities between the arguments made in defence of heterosexual marriage by Finnis (the foremost New Natural Law exponent) and those provided by Family First Senator Fielding (Vic) when enthusing about marriage during the debates on the motion to disallow the Governor-General’s disallowance. It seems also significant that, although the Prime Minister, in defending the disallowance of the ACT law, did not expressly use Finnis's children and sexual complementarity arguments (analysed below), similar arguments have figured as part of his rhetorical repertoire when defending other regressive policy proposals on the ground of sexuality or gender. Indeed, with such people in Howard's Ministry as conservative Catholic Tony Abbott, and given Finnis's own position of prominence within high profile international Catholic networks and circles, it would be surprising if New Natural Law Theory had not played a role in directly informing the government's action on the ACT legislation.

In addition to informing executive and legislative initiatives of the sort described in this paper, normative arguments for or against the necessary heterosexuality of marriage such as those advanced by New Natural Law Theory are likely to figure among the considerations that Courts might take into account when attempting to determine the constitutional meaning of 'marriage'. This is not so much because the courts would necessarily try to fill that constitutional term with a meaning that happened to support their own convictions on what marriage should be about; rather, it is because a consideration of contemporary debates about what marriage should mean is relevant to establishing what is the contemporary denotation of the term, and may even assist us in determining what is the stable connotation of that term across time. In other words, the constitutional questions considered in the first half of this article are more than just accidentally connected with the normative questions analysed in the second part: the connection is not just at the level of contingent political discourse (both constitutional and normative arguments having been adduced to defend, for example, the disallowance of the ACT legislation), but operates at a deeper level, normative questions being partly relevant to answering the constitutional questions





In this sense, D must be the correct answer.

 

[iPwned3]

True, however you've got to look at the syllabus on executive branch (e.g. police), and the role of executive is to APPLY or Enforce law, Answer B

FUCK THE SYLLABUS MAN, I'M GOING ROGUE!

No, okay. In all seriousness, can you link me the page in the syllabus where it states this?

 

[BigD787]

While, in justifying the disallowance of the ACT legislation, the Attorney-General stressed — and mischaracterized — the constitutional, legal, question, the Prime Minister emphasised the moral, normative, question: marriage had to be preserved as a heterosexual institution.The Greens took issue with this justification for disallowing the Act: 'The only explanation offered is that civil unions would "undermine" marriage, but they cannot explain how this would actually happen.' Indeed, Labor, as we have seen, was apparently prepared to support the legislation partly because it believed it did not impact on marriage as a heterosexual institution.

The government and the opposition disagreed about the proposition that recognising same-sex civil unions would have the effect of undermining heterosexual marriage. They both took for granted one point, however: that marriage should remain heterosexual, apparently because they believe that the value of the institution is somehow bound up with its heterosexual character.Whether or not the value of marriage is inseparable from its heterosexuality is not only the logically antecedent question in the debate over civil unions, but also a fundamental moral question relevant to the issue of the legal recognition of SSM. As we have seen, assuming that CM includes SSM, the Commonwealth could use the marriage power to render inoperative State SSM statutes. But should it?

Given the paucity, tautological character and lack of sophistication of the justifications provided by the government for keeping marriage heterosexual, one has to look elsewhere in order to make sense of the proposition that the value of the institution is somehow inseparable from its heterosexual character. New Natural Law theory provides the most elaborate theory of marriage among those seeking to justify the value of the institution in a way that poses the different sex of the spouses as central to what counts as (valuable) marriage. Further, New Natural Law theorists themselves have claimed that their 'account [of marriage] also articulates thoughts which have historically been implicit in the judgements of many non-philosophical people'. The plausibility of this claim seems to be borne out by the similarities between the arguments made in defence of heterosexual marriage by Finnis (the foremost New Natural Law exponent) and those provided by Family First Senator Fielding (Vic) when enthusing about marriage during the debates on the motion to disallow the Governor-General’s disallowance. It seems also significant that, although the Prime Minister, in defending the disallowance of the ACT law, did not expressly use Finnis's children and sexual complementarity arguments (analysed below), similar arguments have figured as part of his rhetorical repertoire when defending other regressive policy proposals on the ground of sexuality or gender. Indeed, with such people in Howard's Ministry as conservative Catholic Tony Abbott, and given Finnis's own position of prominence within high profile international Catholic networks and circles, it would be surprising if New Natural Law Theory had not played a role in directly informing the government's action on the ACT legislation.

In addition to informing executive and legislative initiatives of the sort described in this paper, normative arguments for or against the necessary heterosexuality of marriage such as those advanced by New Natural Law Theory are likely to figure among the considerations that Courts might take into account when attempting to determine the constitutional meaning of 'marriage'. This is not so much because the courts would necessarily try to fill that constitutional term with a meaning that happened to support their own convictions on what marriage should be about; rather, it is because a consideration of contemporary debates about what marriage should mean is relevant to establishing what is the contemporary denotation of the term, and may even assist us in determining what is the stable connotation of that term across time. In other words, the constitutional questions considered in the first half of this article are more than just accidentally connected with the normative questions analysed in the second part: the connection is not just at the level of contingent political discourse (both constitutional and normative arguments having been adduced to defend, for example, the disallowance of the ACT legislation), but operates at a deeper level, normative questions being partly relevant to answering the constitutional questions





In this sense, D must be the correct answer.

Clever Text Dump...
http://flr.law.anu.edu.au/sites/flr.anulaw.anu.edu.au/files/flr/Zanghellini.pdf
Nice try mate, but you getting all worked up about the answer isn't going to change the fact that you're wrong,
you yourself told everyone to stop getting worked up, hypocritical much.

 

[BigD787]

FUCK THE SYLLABUS MAN, I'M GOING ROGUE!

No, okay. In all seriousness, can you link me the page in the syllabus where it states this?

Obviously the syllabus doesnt directly state this its been interpreted.
The question was on separation, the 3 branches are exec, judiciary and legislature.
the Governor General is a part of the exec, so is the police, they both essentially 'apply' the law.
Thats the reasoning behind B

 

[iPwned3]

Ultimately guys, it doesn't really matter right now. All we have to do is wait until they publish the answers for our paper eventually and then we will either celebrate or go damn. So it's hard to come to the 'correct' answer at this point.

 

[BigD787]

Ultimately guys, it doesn't really matter right now. All we have to do is wait until they publish the answers for our paper eventually and then we will either celebrate or go damn. So it's hard to come to the 'correct' answer at this point.

Well Said bro.

 

[iPwned3]

Obviously the syllabus doesnt directly state this its been interpreted.
The question was on separation, the 3 branches are exec, judiciary and legislature.
the Governor General is a part of the exec, so is the police, they both essentially 'apply' the law.
Thats the reasoning behind B

So, in saying 'its been interpreted', you're essentially saying that it is implied and not expressly stated in the syllabus... sick argument "you've got to LOOK at the syllabus on executive branch (e.g. police), and the role of executive is to APPLY or Enforce law"

Look anyway, I guess we're getting all technical here in the details of what the words 'apply' and 'review' mean etc. So which definitions for these words would we even go off? Thus, it's quite impossible to come to a definitive answer here...

 

[iPwned3]

In saying all this, we never even know...the Board might come to the decision of accepting BOTH answers as correct (they've done in before definitely in Economics and Biology) as technically the Governor-General AND the Police are part of the executive as you said previously.

 

[Spiritual Being]

Clever Text Dump...
http://flr.law.anu.edu.au/sites/flr.anulaw.anu.edu.au/files/flr/Zanghellini.pdf
Nice try mate, but you getting all worked up about the answer isn't going to change the fact that you're wrong,
you yourself told everyone to stop getting worked up, hypocritical much.

I actually put B lol.

I was thinking D (if you go back and read my posts).

So mate, hope you're wrong.

 

[iPwned3]

Is it worth noting that: CHAPTER II--The Executive Government section 61 - Executive power of the Constitution states: "The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor‑General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth." Doesn't say anything about police though?

AustLii Link: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/coaca430/s61.html

 

[Focus is Key]

Shit, I think I got like 15/20 :/

 

[RealiseNothing]

Clever Text Dump...
http://flr.law.anu.edu.au/sites/flr.anulaw.anu.edu.au/files/flr/Zanghellini.pdf
Nice try mate, but you getting all worked up about the answer isn't going to change the fact that you're wrong,
you yourself told everyone to stop getting worked up, hypocritical much.

Q20 is D.

 

[Kipling]

Isn't question 18 A? It makes complete sense whereas B isn't technically 100% true, as it would have to pass through the Senate? Also, if 20 is in fact D, think I got 19/20

 

[Mutant Kitty]

Question 4 was stupid because both actus reus and causation are correct.

Well, regarding criminal law they should both be correct, as causation also refers to the act actually taking place... I went with causation, but I have a feeling it should have been actus reus... fuck.

 

[Spiritual Being]

Question 4 was stupid because both actus reus and causation are correct.

Well, regarding criminal law they should both be correct, as causation also refers to the act actually taking place... I went with causation, but I have a feeling it should have been actus reus... fuck.

Nope, only actus reus.

 

[peza_16]

They are right. Great job man! (what are you aiming for for legal?)

Thanks man! I will be content with a Band 6 haha, how about you?