Does God exist? (1 Viewer)

[Graney]

Completely understandable, but then you would have to concede that it is false that there is no evidence for the existence of God.

I wouldn't conclude something was true just because it is uninteresting/I am lazy.

Not at all, the creation of the universe is itself an active act, this act needs a will, and if something has a will, it is clearly alive.

I disagree, I think it it a 'passive' act, the result of unknowable forces in nature. You are claiming to know the basis upon which a transcendent force acts, or that this can be rationally deduced.

I just object to the whole unmoved mover argument. A rule is assumed that everything has a cause, including the universe. The most immediate and obvious reply is to ask, “But what caused God?”. The standard answer is, “Ah, but God has no cause, god is an exception to that rule”. So essentially, an entire layer of pointless complexity called God is invented and then declared to be an exception to the rule that everything has a cause. If you want to get into the game of deciding that there is no cause for the first cause, then it would be far simpler to simply decide that the universe itself has no cause, there is no need to invent additional and utterly pointless layers of complexity, especially when there is no credible objective evidence that can justify such a leap.

If you follow the proof through, we find that this cause is Necessary in being, meaning it must be Knowledgeable.

'The occasionalist argument', asserts but doesn't explain why the allegedly Necessary cause must have 'Will, Knowledge, Power, and be perfect'.

You have not tried to attack any of the premises either of this argument either

The 'defence of premise 2' assumes that causality applies to the entire universe, this is simply an assumption which we have no way of verifying. The author appeals to 'plausible' a synonym for 'probable', to something it's absurd to apply probability to.

Predicting this objection, the author offers the alternative premise "The movement of my hand was not uncaused.", which commits the logical fallacy of begging the question, the conclusion of the argument is included in this premise.

Proof Number 2: The Moral Argument

Communal is not the right word to use, but we say moral obligation does not exist, since moral obligation still exists even if you are not part of this 'community'. The point being however, is that the view of the 'community' or the 'majority' is no more authoritative, than that of the murderer.

The moral argument is hopeless. It's totally based on an absolute statement, summed up by "It should be clear that in our innate nature, there are values that we hold, that we hold to be objectively true.".

He goes on to argue in regard to a hypothetical murderer "we affirm that they commit immoral acts", "Yet they (affirm they) are not committing immorality.", as though this is some logical contradiction and therefore disproves the notion that morality can be subjective. Again the authors premise begs the question. He asserts that a disagreement about morality must mean subjective morality is illogical (which assumes a conclusion of moral objectivity). But if subjective morality is true a disagreement it is not illogical.

I think the problem is his whole premise and definition of morality is different from someone like Sam Harris, and likely your definition of morality is different from mine. By 'definition of morality', I am speaking in reference to the word morality, and not the individual subjects within your personal/cultural moral framework.

I actually don't totally understand what his definition of morality might be, perhaps you could explain what it means to you?

This completely misses the point. So be it, murder is not a good survival trait, but that says nothing about the morality of the situation.

The authors statement is

"2) If morals are subjective to an unrestricted degree, we can conceive of a world where X is morally agreed upon
3) This is inconceivable"

Yet this is demonstrably wrong, as we can conceive a world where murder is morally agreed upon by groups of people.

Anthropic principle has been discredited completely. It completely misses the point of the fine-tuning, whether or not it is true, that we only observe fine tuning, says nothing to its actual fine tuning, since we can easily conceive of universes where they are not fine-tuned.

The fine-tuning argument depends upon the uniqueness of a universe that is fine tuned to support life. As you say, we can easily conceive that universes that are not fine-tuned to support life exist, as the author concedes a fine tuned universe could arise by chance, in a multiverse theory. If the multiverse theory were true, a finely tuned universe arising by chance, this would be a problem for the designed universe argument (as the author concedes). The author offers several poor objections to a multiverse theory, as follows:

'1. There is no empirical evidence to suggest the existence of multiverses' - All the authors proofs are mostly based on pure logic, rather than empiricism (for instance in proof number 1 where he assumes causality applies to the entire universe), so it's inconsistent and absurd to selectively demand empiricism is his wholly non-empirical argument.

'2. This violates Occam's Razor.' - Occam's razor is a rule of thumb and not proof of anything. The more complex explanation is sometimes true. Regardless, how a multiverse relates to occams razor is debatable and contingent upon many things, in physics proponents of multiverse theory argue that, in terms of Kolmogorov complexity, the proposed multiverse is simpler than a single idiosyncratic universe.

'3. There are problems with the level 2 Multiverse theory' - the author doesn't mention any.

'3*. The Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga has proposed quite an ingenious problem philosophically for this universe. It is the Boltzmann Brains problem: A Boltzmann Brain is a hypothesized self awareness' - The author postulates Boltzmann Brain, as a problem for the theory of a universe finely tuned by chance. Fair enough.

He states: "It is vastly more probable that a universe containing a single Boltzmann brain would fluctuate into existence".

The thing about the Boltzmann Brain is that it applies equally as a philosophical problem for his conception of the universe (a designed reality, by a necessary creator) as it would for the alternative hypothesis (a finely tuned environment occurring by chance).

How does he explain why his observed universe, which could be the result of Boltzmann brain, is in fact not a Boltzmann Brain but is reality? Why is his model superior for explaining why we are not "stand-alone self-aware entities existing in a featureless thermodynamic soup"

He explains it in one sentence - "But we aren't Boltzmann brains!"

Insightful.

No, the Hilbert's Hotel analogy is to show that the existence of an actual infinite in the physical world is ridiculous, which would then be a philosophical argument against the pre-eternity of the universe.

11th century Islamic Philosopher Al-Ghazali argued that only the infinite per se is impossible, arguing for the possibility of the infinite per accidens. 19th century Islamic Poet and Philosopher Muhammad Iqbal also claimed:

"A finite effect can give only a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an un-caused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds."

You seem to misunderstand why the argument works for God, it is because God is Necessary in nature.

Whether you are a dog is contingent, it is true in some conceivable world, but not in others, so your parody argument fails in premise.

"Proof Number 6: The Modal Ontological Argument", again begs the questions, Point 5 asserts that god exists, but point 1 already depends upon god being 'Necessary', which is the same as saying point 5, so the intervening steps are redundant and in fact no explanation has taken place.

There is a heading, "Defense of Premise 1:", but it also assumes that god is Necessary, not whether it is possible that god is necessary. In fact premise 1, which states "It is possible God exists", could be changed to "it is certain God exists", and it would be the same statement (since the Necessary nature of god is being assumed), with the change in wording simply providing greater clarity to the reader that the argument is fallaciously begging the question

 

[Graney]

New thread rule: all posts 1500 words minimum

 

[Sy123]

Your insistence on me begging the question is really quite annoying, either learn how to identify one, or stop accusing people of it.

But, we proceed:

Completely understandable, but then you would have to concede that it is false that there is no evidence for the existence of God.

I wouldn't conclude something was true just because it is uninteresting/I am lazy.

Alright then continue to provide claims that is not backed up by any evidence

Even though you know there are countless arguments for the existence of God, your willingness to go through only a few, and reject everything else, then to say that there is no evidence for the existence of God is a faith based opinion.

Which is a sort of thing your type of people despise.

Not at all, the creation of the universe is itself an active act, this act needs a will, and if something has a will, it is clearly alive.

I disagree, I think it it a 'passive' act, the result of unknowable forces in nature. You are claiming to know the basis upon which a transcendent force acts, or that this can be rationally deduced.

You are arguing that the cause of the universe is unintelligent and random, i.e. without a Will, it is simply the law of nature.

There have been many arguments proposed against such an assertion, over a personal Creator with a Will, one being:

The fact that the contingent thing is temporal, and comes from an eternal cause.

For instance, a man eternally sitting decides to stand up, this cannot be random since it could of happened since eternity past.
But because it happened 'now', it is clear that this cause is not random, has Will, and thus is Personal.

I just object to the whole unmoved mover argument. A rule is assumed that everything has a cause, including the universe. The most immediate and obvious reply is to ask, “But what caused God?”. The standard answer is, “Ah, but God has no cause, god is an exception to that rule”.

Yes God (capital G) is an exception to the rule, but you cut off the theist before he can explain why.

That is, since God is a Maximally Great Being that is Necessary, God must therefore necessarily be Eternal and without beginning.
Also, if we allow God to be a created entity, that is, contingent, then we must ask, what created it? If its another God, then we simply arrive at an infinite regress, therefore it cannot be created for it to be a God, this is as obvious as it can get.

So essentially, an entire layer of pointless complexity called God is invented and then declared to be an exception to the rule that everything has a cause. If you want to get into the game of deciding that there is no cause for the first cause, then it would be far simpler to simply decide that the universe itself has no cause, there is no need to invent additional and utterly pointless layers of complexity, especially when there is no credible objective evidence that can justify such a leap.

Indeed atheists have done that for centuries, like Bertrand Russel and Hume.

But in doing so they accepted the pre-eternity of the universe, since they believed the universe to be necessary and without cause. However the purpose of the Kalam argument (so your paragraph is in the wrong section), is to show that the universe DID begin, and thus is not necessary, and thus requires a necessary cause.

If you follow the proof through, we find that this cause is Necessary in being, meaning it must be Knowledgeable.

'The occasionalist argument', asserts but doesn't explain why the allegedly Necessary cause must have 'Will, Knowledge, Power, and be perfect'.

Since this Necessary cause is constantly creating, He must have Will to create, Knowledge and Power on how and the ability to create. Why these attributes are perfect (in the sense that they apply to all contingent things), has been explained already in the italics:

Poisiting that this Being is restricted only to the First contingent event [i.e. not perfect] would disqualify this being from terminating the infinite regress of causes, since we would need to then posit another Entity in order to specify the application of His attributes to the first event and prevent them from applying to all others. In which case He is not the Entity we are talking about, since we need one which will terminate the infinite regresses of contingent causes. He would only be expanding the regress backwards further, not terminating it.

You have not tried to attack any of the premises either of this argument either

The 'defence of premise 2' assumes that causality applies to the entire universe, this is simply an assumption which we have no way of verifying. The author appeals to 'plausible' a synonym for 'probable', to something it's absurd to apply probability to.

To say that not everything that begins to exist has a cause, is to imply that things can pop into existence uncaused, meaning literally anything can come into existence uncaused, if we are able to compromise. We cannot observe this at all in any part of the universe, we must accept this as a metaphysical fact, to deny it would be a disastrous thing to concede. At the very least it is unscientific.

Predicting this objection, the author offers the alternative premise "The movement of my hand was not uncaused.", which commits the logical fallacy of begging the question, the conclusion of the argument is included in this premise.

It does not beg the question at all, clearly my hand had a cause, I can't say anything about this cause yet, but it had a cause, clearly.
If it does beg the question, please provide the assumption in my argument, in a quotation (so I can see the context), in which I can evaluate it. But I assure you there is none, the argument does not seek to prove that the movement of my hand is caused

Are you positing that me moving my hand had no cause behind it?

Proof Number 2: The Moral Argument

Communal is not the right word to use, but we say moral obligation does not exist, since moral obligation still exists even if you are not part of this 'community'. The point being however, is that the view of the 'community' or the 'majority' is no more authoritative, than that of the murderer.

The moral argument is hopeless. It's totally based on an absolute statement, summed up by "It should be clear that in our innate nature, there are values that we hold, that we hold to be objectively true.".

I had a great amount of writing dedicated to showing the absurdity of denying objective morality, please refer to my defense of Premise

He goes on to argue in regard to a hypothetical murderer "we affirm that they commit immoral acts", "Yet they (affirm they) are not committing immorality.", as though this is some logical contradiction and therefore disproves the notion that morality can be subjective.

I do not recall saying this, I have looked over my post and have not found it, please quote it for me.

In my defense of premise 2, of the objectivity of morality and the absurdity of subjectivist morality, I had given a 7 step logical argument with support, I do not understand why this has been ignored.

Again the authors premise begs the question. He asserts that a disagreement about morality must mean subjective morality is illogical (which assumes a conclusion of moral objectivity). But if subjective morality is true a disagreement it is not illogical.

I think the problem is his whole premise and definition of morality is different from someone like Sam Harris, and likely your definition of morality is different from mine. By 'definition of morality', I am speaking in reference to the word morality, and not the individual subjects within your personal/cultural moral framework.

I actually don't totally understand what his definition of morality might be, perhaps you could explain what it means to you?

Please quote where I have begged the question, with an explanation on how the conclusion is hidden in the premise. I need to know the context of this begging the question, rather than vague finger pointing.

This completely misses the point. So be it, murder is not a good survival trait, but that says nothing about the morality of the situation.

The authors statement is

"2) If morals are subjective to an unrestricted degree, we can conceive of a world where X is morally agreed upon
3) This is inconceivable"

Yet this is demonstrably wrong, as we can conceive a world where murder is morally agreed upon by groups of people.

This does not refute anything, my point in premise (2), is that we can conceive of a world where a moral wrong is agreed upon, it does nothing to say that we can also conceive a world where it is not agreed upon, so be it. Rather the argument is showing the absurdity of subjectivist morality.

Anthropic principle has been discredited completely. It completely misses the point of the fine-tuning, whether or not it is true, that we only observe fine tuning, says nothing to its actual fine tuning, since we can easily conceive of universes where they are not fine-tuned.

The fine-tuning argument depends upon the uniqueness of a universe that is fine tuned to support life. As you say, we can easily conceive that universes that are not fine-tuned to support life exist, as the author concedes a fine tuned universe could arise by chance, in a multiverse theory. If the multiverse theory were true, a finely tuned universe arising by chance, this would be a problem for the designed universe argument (as the author concedes). The author offers several poor objections to a multiverse theory, as follows:

'1. There is no empirical evidence to suggest the existence of multiverses' - All the authors proofs are mostly based on pure logic, rather than empiricism (for instance in proof number 1 where he assumes causality applies to the entire universe), so it's inconsistent and absurd to selectively demand empiricism is his wholly non-empirical argument.

But this argument specifically (the fine-tuning argument) is an argument that draws from empirical knowledge, so if you want to answer the fine-tuning problem with a scientific theory, please demonstrate its empirical evidence.

Your remark: "for instance in proof number 1 where he assumes causality applies to the entire universe"

Does not do anything to provide support for your argument against this point.

'2. This violates Occam's Razor.' - Occam's razor is a rule of thumb and not proof of anything. The more complex explanation is sometimes true. Regardless, how a multiverse relates to occams razor is debatable and contingent upon many things, in physics proponents of multiverse theory argue that, in terms of Kolmogorov complexity, the proposed multiverse is simpler than a single idiosyncratic universe.

I do not use it as proof, but rather supporting evidence. Nevertheless I am happy to concede on this point, I do not know enough about the intricacies of multiverse theory.

'3. There are problems with the level 2 Multiverse theory' - the author doesn't mention any.

Wait for it I literally address it the next line

'3*. The Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga has proposed quite an ingenious problem philosophically for this universe. It is the Boltzmann Brains problem: A Boltzmann Brain is a hypothesized self awareness' - The author postulates Boltzmann Brain, as a problem for the theory of a universe finely tuned by chance. Fair enough.

He states: "It is vastly more probable that a universe containing a single Boltzmann brain would fluctuate into existence".

The thing about the Boltzmann Brain is that it applies equally as a philosophical problem for his conception of the universe (a designed reality, by a necessary creator) as it would for the alternative hypothesis (a finely tuned environment occurring by chance).

No it most certainly does not, it is only a problem for those who ask for some sort of random universe generator, not a Necessary creator who may wish to create a Boltzmann Brain, or not.

How does he explain why his observed universe, which could be the result of Boltzmann brain, is in fact not a Boltzmann Brain but is reality? Why is his model superior for explaining why we are not "stand-alone self-aware entities existing in a featureless thermodynamic soup"

He explains it in one sentence - "But we aren't Boltzmann brains!"

Insightful.

I quote William Lane Craig in my post, italicize the important bit, and call it important, being:

"The most probable observable world would be one in which a single brain fluctuates into existence out of the quantum vacuum and observes its otherwise empty world."

But we do not observe an empty world, indeed we actually observe an incredibly vast universe. So we cannot be a Boltzmann brain, but I'm suprised at your willingless to concede that you're a boltzmann brain, such a concession is analogous to believing in Solipsism. Itself leading to laughable absurdity.

No, the Hilbert's Hotel analogy is to show that the existence of an actual infinite in the physical world is ridiculous, which would then be a philosophical argument against the pre-eternity of the universe.

11th century Islamic Philosopher Al-Ghazali argued that only the infinite per se is impossible, arguing for the possibility of the infinite per accidens. 19th century Islamic Poet and Philosopher Muhammad Iqbal also claimed:

"A finite effect can give only a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an un-caused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds."

I don't know the purpose of quoting such scholars, perhaps to try and accuse me of being heterodox?
Nevertheless, Muhammad Iqbal, although a great poet that he was, is not an authority in Islamic theology.

It also amazes me that you try to use Imam Ghazali to try and refute my conception of absurdity of an actual infinite in the physical world.

In his Incoherence of the Philosophers, Imam Ghazali refutes the Avincennan philosophers and charges them with unbelief, (not merely heterodoxy), one of the reasons for his charge is because they believed in the pre-eternity of the universe.

You seem to misunderstand why the argument works for God, it is because God is Necessary in nature.

Whether you are a dog is contingent, it is true in some conceivable world, but not in others, so your parody argument fails in premise.

"Proof Number 6: The Modal Ontological Argument", again begs the questions, Point 5 asserts that god exists, but point 1 already depends upon god being 'Necessary', which is the same as saying point 5, so the intervening steps are redundant and in fact no explanation has taken place.

Amazing that you can call an argument devised by professional philosophers as begging the question.

Anyway, point 5 is not the same as saying point 1. In point 1, it is only asking for the possibility of whether God (capital G) exists, it does not assume God exists in the first place.

There is a heading, "Defense of Premise 1:", but it also assumes that god is Necessary, not whether it is possible that god is necessary.

How can we 'assume' that God is Necessary? God is defined as being Necessary, since that is really what we mean by God, if God was not necessary, than He is contingent, if He is contingent, He must come from somewhere, if He comes from somewhere, then what we are talking about really isn't God.

In fact premise 1, which states "It is possible God exists", could be changed to "it is certain God exists", and it would be the same statement (since the Necessary nature of god is being assumed)

Well to say 'it is certain God exists' is the conclusion, your thought process of going from It is possible, to it is actual, is exactly what the argument is, the fact that God, being Maximally Great, is Necessary in existence, must exist in all possible worlds, and therefore in our world too. What could be more intuitive than that?

For example, whether Goldbach's Conjecture is true, we cannot know whether it is possible or not that Goldbach's conjecture is true, since we cannot test an infinite amount of integers.

-------------------

Did you get someone else to write this for you, or are you simply fond of saying 'the author'?

 

[Graney]

Even though you know there are countless arguments for the existence of God, your willingness to go through only a few, and reject everything else, then to say that there is no evidence for the existence of God is a faith based opinion.

They're not literally countless, and as I read some common proofs I assume I would be exposed to the best quality proofs available, it would be inefficient to consider everything written on any subject.

You are arguing that the cause of the universe is unintelligent and random, i.e. without a Will, it is simply the law of nature.

I'm really agnostic, I'm not asserting that this is true, but that without knowledge it is equally plausible to some alternative hypothesis, and to make a point I may argue it is true if convenient.


There have been many arguments proposed against such an assertion, over a personal Creator with a Will, one being:

The fact that the contingent thing is temporal, and comes from an eternal cause.

For instance, a man eternally sitting decides to stand up, this cannot be random since it could of happened since eternity past.
But because it happened 'now', it is clear that this cause is not random, has Will, and thus is Personal.

The phrase 'eternity past' is absurb, the notion of an eternal cause is non-empirical, and outside the realm of anything observed. The event you're talking about is the origin of the universe, and you assert that 1 rule of the universe must consistently apply (causality) even in the most extreme and unseen case of the origin of the universe, while dismissing another rule (the impossibility of anything before time, by the introduction of an eternal transcendental). You assert eternity is possible (in the form of the transcendental, which attains the ability to violate the finite nature of time via special pleading), yet we observe in reality that time is finite.

The cosmological argument that everything requires a cause, but then creates a special case that god doesn't require a cause, without any rigorous explanation why, other than to say that it is inherently in Gods nature to be a special pleading.

Even if we assume the special pleading argument is true, that there must a first cause, it can equally be used to support an impersonal Deist force, or polytheism, for example, each of the four fundamental forces of nature was created by a different god


To say that not everything that begins to exist has a cause, is to imply that things can pop into existence uncaused, meaning literally anything can come into existence uncaused, if we are able to compromise. We cannot observe this at all in any part of the universe, we must accept this as a metaphysical fact, to deny it would be a disastrous thing to concede.

For God to be the special pleading case that you assert, it must have many of the exact quality you object to - being uncaused (although you get around this by it being the special case that it did not pop into existence, but was allegedly eternal - something which we cannot observe at all in any part of the universe). It would be equally disastrous to concede that an eternal transcendental exists.


Are you positing that me moving my hand had no cause behind it?

It is as plausible that causality can break down at some point, as it is to say that the finite nature of time can also be violated by an eternal.


I had a great amount of writing dedicated to showing the absurdity of denying objective morality, please refer to my defense of Premise

I do not recall saying this, I have looked over my post and have not found it, please quote it for me.

In my defense of premise 2, of the objectivity of morality and the absurdity of subjectivist morality, I had given a 7 step logical argument with support, I do not understand why this has been ignored.

I can only conclude that you have a different definition of morality to me. I don't see how 'infinite regress of subjective rules' can be a problem in regard to morality, the support of one moral proposition doesn't necessarily depend upon the support of another proposition, certainly not an unlimited number. Unrestricted moral subjectivity is true, there are just individuals, or groups of individuals, who perceive their own morality as right.



But this argument specifically (the fine-tuning argument) is an argument that draws from empirical knowledge, so if you want to answer the fine-tuning problem with a scientific theory, please demonstrate its empirical evidence.

You can't answer the fine tuning problem with empirical evidence either, and I'm not insisting that it be answered with empirical evidence. I'm objecting that your answer (eternal creator) is also non-empirical, so therefore 'multiverse is non-empirical', is not a valid criticism.


No it most certainly does not, it is only a problem for those who ask for some sort of random universe generator, not a Necessary creator who may wish to create a Boltzmann Brain, or not.

I quote William Lane Craig in my post, italicize the important bit, and call it important, being:

"The most probable observable world would be one in which a single brain fluctuates into existence out of the quantum vacuum and observes its otherwise empty world."

But we do not observe an empty world, indeed we actually observe an incredibly vast universe. So we cannot be a Boltzmann brain, but I'm suprised at your willingless to concede that you're a boltzmann brain, such a concession is analogous to believing in Solipsism. Itself leading to laughable absurdity.

Boltzmann Brain theory doesn't insist on the observation of an empty world. It actually suggests that the self-aware brains that spontaneously randomly form out of the chaos may be complete with false memories of a life like ours.

So a Boltzmann Brain identical to your experience of the universe can be created by a necessary creator, or a Boltzmann Brain which appears randomly to suggest such a universe, are possibilities.

It is indeed analogous to Solipsism, which is as much a problem for your worldview as mine.

Amazing that you can call an argument devised by professional philosophers as begging the question.

Anyway, point 5 is not the same as saying point 1. In point 1, it is only asking for the possibility of whether God (capital G) exists, it does not assume God exists in the first place.

Point 1 states "It is possible God exists". You have said that "God is defined as being Necessary". Is it possible for something that is Necessary to not exist?

If it is possible for a Necessary thing to not exist, then it is not in fact Necessary. If it is not possible for a Necessary thing to not exist, and God is defined as Necessary, then the conclusion 'it is certain God exists', is already contained fully in point 1. It does indeed assume that God exists in the first place, by his definition as Necessary.


Did you get someone else to write this for you, or are you simply fond of saying 'the author'?

I wrote the Author, because I assumed you didn't write them, surely no one would write 4000 words of proofs of God unprompted simply to post on a forum read by a dozen people, and that you were copying these from somewhere, but perhaps I was wrong.

 

[Squar3root]

If i pass my physics exam then yes

 

[kalstar]

If i pass my physics exam then yes

God only exists on (a) The day before the exam or (b) The day of the exam.

 

[Squar3root]

God only exists on (a) The day before the exam or (b) The day of the exam.

lel

 

[kalstar]

lel

srs. watch everyone tomorrow.

 

[kalstar]

 

[Squar3root]

srs. watch everyone tomorrow.

tbh; i would not be surprised. In fact before the exam; there might be like on of those prayer sessions


and; i feel like i know you?

 

[kalstar]

tbh; i would not be surprised. In fact before the exam; there might be like on of those prayer sessions


and; i feel like i know you?

God will forgive for lack of study.

Not sure lol.

 

[Squar3root]

God will forgive for lack of study.

Not sure lol.

did you do the solar elevator?

 

[kaz1]

Except we believe that such people with bad circumstances in their life will be recompensed in the here-after for their suffering

Also according to you and other people with disgusting naturalistic beliefs, believe that such poor children are part of natural selection, and that is simply how it is.
Also the people oppressing those poor children have literally no objective difference to someone giving charity to the poor.

They are the same objectively since you foolishly deny objective morality.

But since you are so keen on taking moral high-ground, let me show you how foolish such a position is.

---------------------------------------

One way to show that naturalists cannot believe in moral obligation is showing that a belief in naturalism implies a belief in hard determinism.

That is, everything we do has been determined at the start of the universe, and when I say determined, I don't mean that Someone knows what happens, but rather
you have absolutely no choice in matters, what you do in 6 years is completely determined, you have no choice.


Take the following logical argument:

1. All forms of matter must obey the physical laws of the universe.

2. On naturalism, the actions of humans are derived from forms of matter, only.

3. Therefore, the actions of human beings must obey the physical laws of the universe.

4. The physical laws of the universe cannot be changed

5. Thus the actions of human beings cannot be changed

The first premise is given by an assumption of naturalism (atheism)

The second premise is also following the assumption of naturalism, there is nothing instrinsically 'extra-natural' in us.
On naturalism indeed, we are no different to apes, rocks and diahrea

The third premise comes from (1,2)

The fourth premise also follows from science and an assumption of naturalism

The fifth premise comes from (3,4)

-----

So it follows quite clearly, that 'Newtonian determinism' is true on a naturalistic worldview.

What does this imply for moral obligation?

Well, we ask the question, what is the fault of Hitler? Are his actions not just the result of the laws of physics
and chemistry working to produce his actions?

We see that there can be no fault pinned on the murderer, or the torturer of children, since they are merely acting
on the laws of physics and chemistry. (Of course magnified a billion times)

It is quite clear that moral obligation therefore does not exist on naturalism.

Note, you may even be a Natural law theorist (i.e. objective moral values are as true as the natural numbers) who is a naturalist
but you still needs to concede that Newtonian determinsism is a pillar of you belief, and thus you need to reject moral obligation.


-----

So at this point, we can offer the weaker Moral argument for the existence of God (one that only relies on moral obligation, rather than moral obligation and moral ontology)

1. If God does not exist, moral obligation does not exist

2. Moral obligation does exist.

3. Therefore, God exists.

The defense of (1) has been given above in great detail, proving the correlation of determinism and naturalism.
The defense of (2) should come from the hearts of any sane person, people who disagree with this should be locked up never to see the light of day
Why? Well, why not? I'm not obligated to give you freedom after all (on the view of the one who disagrees with (2))

Thank you for outlining my morality, I didn't know what it was before.

I believe that we should help the poor people now in this life because it is the only life they have and believing that poor oppressed people have salvation in the next life probably stops religious people from helping them out because they're probably thinking "the poors are fucked now but when they die they'll be having non-stop orgies with 72 virgins, they'll be fine".

And natural selection explains how we got here, it has nothing whatsoever to do with morality. Let's now mourn how immoral earthquakes and tsunamis are.

If you're curious my moralities are mainly from the golden rule "One should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself".

And there is a natural or darwinian explanation for morality and altruism, helping one person would mean that they would probably help you as well so there is a greater chance that you survive.

Your god's morality seems to include stoning adulterers, beheading appostates, flogging gays and fucking children. "God" seems more like a source of immorality .

 

[Squar3root]

well that escalated quickly

 

[kalstar]

Nah I didn't XD

 

[Squar3root]

Nah I didn't XD

see i knew that. you did the mech one

 

[kalstar]

nope LOL

 

[Sy123]

Even though you know there are countless arguments for the existence of God, your willingness to go through only a few, and reject everything else, then to say that there is no evidence for the existence of God is a faith based opinion.

They're not literally countless, and as I read some common proofs I assume I would be exposed to the best quality proofs available, it would be inefficient to consider everything written on any subject.

However, you clearly conceded on an important amount of points, in conceiving that you may be a Boltzmann Brain and that I do not really exist as a mind.
Especially considering the Fine-Tuning argument, instead of trying to refute a design hypothesis, you go for a multi-verse hypothesis, which you admit has as small empirical evidence as a Necessary Creator.

What this means is that God (for you) is an alternative hypothesis to an infinitely generating multiverse. Meaning there clearly still is some evidence for the existence of God.

There have been many arguments proposed against such an assertion, over a personal Creator with a Will, one being:

The fact that the contingent thing is temporal, and comes from an eternal cause.

For instance, a man eternally sitting decides to stand up, this cannot be random since it could of happened since eternity past.
But because it happened 'now', it is clear that this cause is not random, has Will, and thus is Personal.

The phrase 'eternity past' is absurb, the notion of an eternal cause is non-empirical, and outside the realm of anything observed. The event you're talking about is the origin of the universe, and you assert that 1 rule of the universe must consistently apply (causality) even in the most extreme and unseen case of the origin of the universe, while dismissing another rule (the impossibility of anything before time, by the introduction of an eternal transcendental). You assert eternity is possible (in the form of the transcendental, which attains the ability to violate the finite nature of time via special pleading), yet we observe in reality that time is finite.

You say that a notion of an eternal cause is non-empirical.
I say that the number 2, and squares are non-empirical, these are necessary metaphysical objects, they do not require empirical verification to see if there is physical absurdity, since they cannot contain physical absurdity, since they are beyond physicality.

This is exactly what God is, of course we have no direct empirical evidence for God, since if we did, then it is clearly not a God, that can be grasped fully and seen.

If you deny that eternity can exist, then you must assert that there was a beginning of the multiverse. This raises doubt, how can something come into exist without a cause?

Moreover, the necessary existent natural numbers, and shape definitions, these things are eternal, they cannot 'not exist'. Therefore eternal in existence.

To compromise even a little bit on the premise that "out of nothing, nothing comes", would be disastrous.

Not only is this premise based in all science that we have done, but it is based in metaphysical necessity.

To deny that, "out of nothing, nothing comes", is like to denying that:

P implies Q, P, therefore Q.

Because, 'we only observe this fact in this part of the universe, how can this hold in other parts of the universe!'
This is a metaphysical necessary fact, it is what we observe in our experience, and we must therefore take it as axiomatically true.

Moreover, if we accept that something can come from nothing, since nothing has no specific attributes (by definition), therefore anything and everything can come into being from nothing. This is absurd, are we to accept that Boeing 747s, Cristiano Ronaldo's and Meat Pies can come into existence in my backyard, uncaused?

The cosmological argument that everything requires a cause, but then creates a special case that god doesn't require a cause, without any rigorous explanation why, other than to say that it is inherently in Gods nature to be a special pleading.

It is certainly not special pleading, it would be special pleading if we skip asking if the universe is uncaused, and move to God.

We know that the universe is not uncaused, since it came into being. Like I have already said, if the universe was Necessary, then it would be eternal. We know it is not eternal, thus it cannot be Necessary.

Even if we assume the special pleading argument is true, that there must a first cause, it can equally be used to support an impersonal Deist force, or polytheism, for example, each of the four fundamental forces of nature was created by a different god

Yes it can, but this does nothing to defeat the outcome of the first cause argument.

But you are on the wrong argument section right here, this is proving the philosophy of occasionalism, proving that a Necessary Being has created the universe at every given moment. This is clearly incompatible with Deism since on deism, God does not interact with the universe.

To say that not everything that begins to exist has a cause, is to imply that things can pop into existence uncaused, meaning literally anything can come into existence uncaused, if we are able to compromise. We cannot observe this at all in any part of the universe, we must accept this as a metaphysical fact, to deny it would be a disastrous thing to concede.

For God to be the special pleading case that you assert, it must have many of the exact quality you object to - being uncaused (although you get around this by it being the special case that it did not pop into existence, but was allegedly eternal - something which we cannot observe at all in any part of the universe). It would be equally disastrous to concede that an eternal transcendental exists.

Not at all, again you appeal to the notion that we cannot observe eternal transcendence, we don't. But that doesn't really matter, we cannot observe the number 2, or squares empirically.

We assert that a metaphysical transcendent has created the universe through philosophical arguments, this needs a refutation from philosophy.

Are you positing that me moving my hand had no cause behind it?

It is as plausible that causality can break down at some point, as it is to say that the finite nature of time can also be violated by an eternal.

Then I refer you to the defense of the premise that "Everything that begins to exist has a cause", to deny that the movement of my hand is uncaused goes against all science and philosophy.

To defend the notion that my hand moved without a cause is very difficult. Since there is nothing instrinsic about the movement of my hand, instead I refer you to all events in nature in the entire universe.

To deny that my hand moved uncaused, purely to escape the conclusion of my argument. Would then lead someone to deny causality at all!

Since I can recreate the occasionalist argument with the movement of your hand, or the sun giving off light, or anything!
We must conclude then that causation does not exist!

I had a great amount of writing dedicated to showing the absurdity of denying objective morality, please refer to my defense of Premise

I do not recall saying this, I have looked over my post and have not found it, please quote it for me.

In my defense of premise 2, of the objectivity of morality and the absurdity of subjectivist morality, I had given a 7 step logical argument with support, I do not understand why this has been ignored.

I can only conclude that you have a different definition of morality to me. I don't see how 'infinite regress of subjective rules' can be a problem in regard to morality, the support of one moral proposition doesn't necessarily depend upon the support of another proposition, certainly not an unlimited number. Unrestricted moral subjectivity is true, there are just individuals, or groups of individuals, who perceive their own morality as right.

What is your definition of morality then?

I've had many atheists before tell me this exact same statement, I'd like to know your definition of morality, to determine how I can alter my argument, or argue against the coherence of such a definition, (for example your definition might lead to situations where we know intuitively for that action to be bad).

One example of a definition is (not saying this is your definition), that morality is what the majority says. But clearly we can concieve of worlds where the majority agree on child torture, to say torturing children is ok in their world is inconcievable, therefore such a definition of morality is incoherent.

Likewise, Sam Harris's defintion of the flourishing of conscious creatures being good, would lead to a similar conclusion.

So I would like to know what your definition is then.

But this argument specifically (the fine-tuning argument) is an argument that draws from empirical knowledge, so if you want to answer the fine-tuning problem with a scientific theory, please demonstrate its empirical evidence.

You can't answer the fine tuning problem with empirical evidence either, and I'm not insisting that it be answered with empirical evidence. I'm objecting that your answer (eternal creator) is also non-empirical, so therefore 'multiverse is non-empirical', is not a valid criticism.

I do not think that these 2 are comparable, for a multiverse is a physical entity, a scientific theory. Whereas the concept of God is not physical, nor is a scientific theory.

No it most certainly does not, it is only a problem for those who ask for some sort of random universe generator, not a Necessary creator who may wish to create a Boltzmann Brain, or not.

I quote William Lane Craig in my post, italicize the important bit, and call it important, being:

"The most probable observable world would be one in which a single brain fluctuates into existence out of the quantum vacuum and observes its otherwise empty world."

But we do not observe an empty world, indeed we actually observe an incredibly vast universe. So we cannot be a Boltzmann brain, but I'm suprised at your willingless to concede that you're a boltzmann brain, such a concession is analogous to believing in Solipsism. Itself leading to laughable absurdity.

Boltzmann Brain theory doesn't insist on the observation of an empty world. It actually suggests that the self-aware brains that spontaneously randomly form out of the chaos may be complete with false memories of a life like ours.

So a Boltzmann Brain identical to your experience of the universe can be created by a necessary creator, or a Boltzmann Brain which appears randomly to suggest such a universe, are possibilities.

It is indeed analogous to Solipsism, which is as much a problem for your worldview as mine.

So then you are saying that we may be Boltzmann Brains, in an empty world (since this is the most probable), but we (you) have false perceptions of a vast universe?
This is an amazing concession, but if you are willing to concede on that, then sure I can stop right here. Since you are suggesting that theism or solipsism are the only viable options given the fine tuning argument.

1. Theism or Solipsism is true from the Fine Tuning argument
2. Solipsism is false
3. Thus Theism is true.

If this does not convince you, then very little will, since you are arguing that you are the only existent mind and that this is all an illusion.

As I've said before, this leads to laughable absurdity, if you hold it, go right ahead

Amazing that you can call an argument devised by professional philosophers as begging the question.

Anyway, point 5 is not the same as saying point 1. In point 1, it is only asking for the possibility of whether God (capital G) exists, it does not assume God exists in the first place.

Point 1 states "It is possible God exists". You have said that "God is defined as being Necessary". Is it possible for something that is Necessary to not exist?

If it is possible for a Necessary thing to not exist, then it is not in fact Necessary. If it is not possible for a Necessary thing to not exist, and God is defined as Necessary, then the conclusion 'it is certain God exists', is already contained fully in point 1. It does indeed assume that God exists in the first place, by his definition as Necessary.

God is Necessary because He is Maximally Great, that is what I've been saying.

Not, God is Necessary, because we said so.

Rather, clearly, God, a theoretical concept at this point, if He were God, would need to be Necessary, since being Maximally Great entails great making properties, including All-Power, Knowledge and Will.

Being Necessary comes from God being Maximally Great, allowing us to jump from premise 2 to 3.
Allowing the conclusion to be met

I do not see how this is begging the question. It is begging the question if I arbitrarily define God has Necessary, but I have good reasons to think that He is Necessary on account on Him being Maximally Great.

 

[kalstar]

y so srs

 

[Sy123]

I believe that we should help the poor people now in this life because it is the only life they have

So what that you're helping anybody?

We're all going to perish in the heat death of the universe anyway, no hope for continuing civilizations, you helping those poor people is for naught, everything human beings do are for naught. There is no use in anything, life becomes absolutely absurd.

and believing that poor oppressed people have salvation in the next life probably stops religious people from helping them out because they're probably thinking "the poors are fucked now but when they die they'll be having non-stop orgies with 72 virgins, they'll be fine".

It doesn't stop them from helping out. Because alms-giving is a major part of Islam (and frankly every other religious faith). Religious people are encouraged to give to the poor, and to help the oppressed.

Unlike atheistic naturalism, which views these poor children as part of the natural selection process

And natural selection explains how we got here, it has nothing whatsoever to do with morality. Let's now mourn how immoral earthquakes and tsunamis are.

I'm not saying it has anything to do with morality, I'm just saying that to you, their part of the process of natural selection, these poor african children dying, are meant to die, they are the weaker race, and will be eventually cut out by natural selection.

If you're curious my moralities are mainly from the golden rule "One should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself".

What about masochists then

What if I gave charity, but would rather not people give me charity when I'm poor because I don't want to be a burden on others? Am I committing immorality by giving charity?

----

Also its entirely irrelevant what your morality premise is, what if someone doesn't agree with it? They call you immoral, and you call them immoral, so what has been achieved? Nothing, since everyone has an opinion.

And there is a natural or darwinian explanation for morality and altruism, helping one person would mean that they would probably help you as well so there is a greater chance that you survive.

So what, why does it matter that its a better survival tactic to be altruistic? (Also it is not always true)

We can conceive of a world where the survival tactic is to torture the children of others.

How can this be a premise for morality?

---

Again entirely irrelevant, what if I simply disagree with your morality

Your god's morality seems to include stoning adulterers, beheading appostates, flogging gays and fucking children. "God" seems more like a source of immorality .

Again your immorality is subjective, so what is the use of calling something immoral?

The Prophet Muhammad did not have intercourse with children, so you're wrong there.
Children are people below the age of puberty in Islam, as stipulated by God and His Messenger. The Holy Messenger did not have intercourse with Aisha when she was a child.

As for the apostasy:

- Yes it is true that the classical opinion on the apostate must be killed

- However, the opinion of the Hanafi school of thought, which compromises the majority of Muslims today, are of the opinion that the apostate is not killed because he is an apostate (I say he since you cannot kill a female apostate), but because he proposes a threat to the Muslims, since he can easily change forces and be part of the enemy army.

So this execution would come forbidding the potential of what is called Hirabah

Hirabah is generally agreed to be spreading corruption and deceit in the land.

Hirabah is expressly condemned in the Holy Qur'an here:

Indeed, the penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and strive upon earth [to cause] corruption is none but that they be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be exiled from the land. That is for them a disgrace in this world; and for them in the Hereafter is a great punishment.

Except for those who return [repenting] before you apprehend them. And know that Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.​

- (5:33-34)

This is why only the male apostate is killed, and not female apostates, since female apostates in general do not pose a military threat to the Muslim rulers.

Whereas males are killed, but the important point here is that they are not killed because they are apostates, but because they represent a threat to Muslims, as such, private apostasy cannot even be convicted let alone punished.

This interpretation makes complete sense given the context of the saying of the Holy Messenger in which he says "...Whoever leaves his religion, kill him..."
Since this was a time of war, where people (historically reported) would apostate on purpose to deliver important military information to the polytheist arab leaders.

So this was a preventative measure against Hirabah, which lends support to this juristic verdict.

------------

Nevertheless it is entirely irrelevant, since you have no basis on which morality can be defined, whereas I do, which is, that God says its morally good, therefore it is morally good.